Standing Committee E

[Mr. Joe Benton in the Chair]

Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill [Lords]

Schedule 7 - Minor and consequential amendments

Ann Cryer: I beg to move amendment No. 124, in schedule 7, page 44, line 14, at end insert—
'43 In Schedule 21 to that Act (Determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory life sentence) after sub-paragraph 10(e) insert— 
 ''(ea) a connection to a forced marriage or attempted forced marriage, 
 (eb) a connection to an offence aggravated by the victim's perceived conduct as defined under section 145A,''.'.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: new clause 40—Forced marriage—
'(1) A person commits an offence if he causes or attempts to cause another person to enter into a forced marriage. 
 (2) In this section ''forced marriage'' means a marriage entered into in which one or both parties has been subject to— 
 (a) intimidation, 
 (b) harassment, 
 (c) false imprisonment, or 
 (d) domestic violence 
 with the intent to cause the party or parties to enter into the marriage. 
 (3) For the purposes of this section ''domestic violence'' means— 
 (a) physical abuse; 
 (b) sexual abuse; 
 (c) psychological or emotional abuse, including, but not limited to— 
 (i) intimidation; 
 (ii) harassment; 
 (iii) false imprisonment; 
 (iv) damage to property; 
 (v) threats of physical abuse, sexual abuse or psychological or emotional abuse; 
 (d) any act defined under paragraphs (a) to (c) directed against a dependant of the person, 
 (e) threats of any act under paragraph (d) 
 committed by a cohabitant, relative or member of the same household. 
 (4) In this section— 
 ''cohabitant'' and ''relative'' have the same meaning as in section 62 of the Family Law Act 1996; 
 ''member'' of a particular household has the same meaning as in section 5 of this Act. 
 (5) Behaviour which does not involve actual or threatened physical or sexual abuse may be psychological or emotional abuse for the purposes of subsection (3)(c). 
 (6) Without limiting subsection (2)— 
 (a) a single act may amount to domestic violence for the purposes of that subsection; 
 (b) a number of acts that form part of a pattern of behaviour may amount to domestic violence for that purpose, even if, taken individually, some or all of those acts would not be of sufficient severity to meet the criteria in subsection (3). 
 (7) A person (whether or not a United Kingdom national or permanent United Kingdom resident) is guilty of an offence if he aids, abets, counsels or procures a person (whether or not a United Kingdom national or permanent United Kingdom resident) to commit an offence under subsection (1). 
 (8) An act is a relevant act for the purposes of this section if it would constitute an offence under subsection (1) or (7), and— 
 (a) it is done in relation to a United Kingdom national or permanent United Kingdom resident (whether or not done in the United Kingdom), or 
 (b) it is done in the United Kingdom (whether or not by a person who is a United Kingdom national or permanent United Kingdom resident), or 
 (c) it is done outside the United Kingdom by a United Kingdom national or permanent United Kingdom resident. 
 (9) If an offence under this section is committed outside the United Kingdom— 
 (a) proceedings may be taken, and 
 (b) the offence may for incidental purposes be treated as having been committed, 
 in any place in England and Wales or Northern Ireland. 
 (10) A person to whom an act is done which would constitute an offence under subsection (1) or (7), but which is not a relevant act, is a victim (as defined by section 29 of this Act), while resident in the United Kingdom. 
 (11) A United Kingdom national is an individual who is— 
 (a) a British citizen, a British overseas territories citizen, a British National (Overseas) or a British Overseas citizen, 
 (b) a person who under the British Nationality Act 1981 (c.61) is a British subject, or 
 (c) a British protected person within the meaning of that Act. 
 (12) A permanent United Kingdom resident is an individual who is settled in the United Kingdom (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971 (c.77)). 
 (13) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable— 
 (a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years, or a fine, or both; 
 (b) a summary conviction, imprisonment for a term not exceeding 18 months, or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both. 
 (14) After section 12(f) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (c.18) (Grounds on which a marriage is voidable) insert— 
 ''(g) that either party was subject to an offence under section [Forced marriage] of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004''. 
 (15) In Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c.44) (Determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory life sentence) after sub-paragraph 10(e) insert— 
 ''(ea) a connection to a forced marriage or attempted forced marriage,''.'.
 New clause 41—Victim's perceived conduct ('honour crimes')— 
'In Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c.44) after section 145 (Increase in sentences for racial or religious aggravation) insert— 
 ''145A Increase in sentences for offences aggravated by the victim's perceived conduct (honour crimes) 
 (1) This section applies where a court is considering the seriousness of an offence. 
 (2) If the offence was aggravated by the victim's perceived conduct as defined by this section, the court— 
 (a) must treat that fact as an aggravating factor, and 
 (b) must state in open court that the offence was so aggravated. 
 (3) For the purposes of this section an offence aggravated by the victim's perceived conduct means an offence motivated (wholly or partly) by a belief that— 
 (a) the victim's conduct has disgraced the victim's family by defying cultural rules, or 
 (b) the victim has aided, abetted, solicited or encouraged conduct by a person considered to have disgraced the person's family by defying cultural rules. 
 (4) 'cultural rules' includes codes of behaviour (whether or not formally expressed) relating to religious, racial, or ethnic communities.''.'.

Ann Cryer: Amendment No. 124 is a probing amendment. Grouped with it are new clause 40, which deals with forced marriages, and new clause 41, which deals with perceived conduct and honour crimes. First, I will speak about honour crimes—mainly, honour killings—because there is a clear connection between crimes of honour and honour killings and forced marriages.
 The problem with honour killings is that they go unrecognised. A couple of weeks ago, there was a conference in The Hague, which has been mentioned in various contexts. Earlier in Committee we talked about domestic homicide reviews; such reviews would be useful in identifying killings related to crimes of honour. About a year ago, I did a report for the Council of Europe Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men. I was asked to be the rapporteur on honour killings in the 52 states of the Council of Europe. It was traumatic to go into all the details of the issue, but the worst thing was that it was extremely difficult to get information on the subject: because none of the states of Europe identify honour killings as such, it is extremely difficult to get facts and figures. 
 At the conference in The Hague, police officers said that if we do not know which killings are related to crimes of honour it is extremely difficult to establish patterns. Police forces in areas with large ethnic communities would be helped if, on sentencing or at some point during the proceedings, mention was made of honour killings, and if honour killings were specifically treated as such. The amendment mentions 
''a connection to an offence aggravated by the victim's perceived conduct as defined under section 145A'',
 and new clause 41 refers to an 
''Increase in sentences for offences aggravated by the victim's perceived conduct (honour crimes)''.
 I am not pushing for all of that; I simply point out to the Government and the Minister that if we could identify such crimes, police forces throughout the country would know what they were looking for. Social services departments, schools and colleges would all be in the picture about things that might go wrong for a particular girl or woman, and could identify those things before she was killed. That is what I really want to ensure this morning. I want to make the Government aware and I want them to look into the issue. 
 When I prepared the Council of Europe report 12 months ago, I heard again and again that people 
 did not know what was happening, even though all the warning signals were present beforehand. Even though things were going wrong in a girl's life, she lacked protection because people did not know the pattern. In fact, they were not even establishing patterns. The clause on domestic homicide reviews will help greatly to identify what things were going wrong in a girl's life before she met a horrible end. Colleges, schools, social services departments and the police will therefore know where to look. 
 New clause 40, which embodies the main thrust of my arguments, would deal with forced marriages. It begins: 
''A person commits an offence if he causes or attempts to cause another person to enter into a forced marriage.''
 The Government have done some pretty brave and imaginative things to protect girls from forced marriage, but thus far we have not really carried with us the various communities that go in for forced marriage, even though they have been sympathetic and made all the right noises—certainly the communities in my constituency have done so, although five years ago, when I first raised the issue in an Adjournment debate, I was told that there was no such thing as forced marriage; my constituents said that I had dreamt it up. Now, every week a girl comes to me to ask for help in putting a stop on her husband's entry clearance. 
 We have a term for such girls now: reluctant sponsors. Reluctant sponsors know very well the difference between a forced and an arranged marriage. One of the points that keep being put to me is that I do not understand the culture and that the marriages are arranged, not forced. There is a clear difference; yet the issue of forced marriage has kept raising its ugly head during the five years in which I have been dealing with it. My hon. Friends the Members for Bradford, North (Mr. Rooney) and for Bradford, West (Mr. Singh) deal with as many as two cases a week of girls who are reluctant sponsors. 
 Such girls have the support of many of the community leaders and of many other women in their community, and they certainly have the support of the Government and. Almost immediately after my Adjournment debate five years ago, the Home Office set up a working group, jointly and very capably chaired by Baroness Uddin and Lord Ahmed, to consider the causes and the results of forced marriage. As a result, all sorts of changes were made to the way in which the various statutory authorities worked. I am proud to say that West Yorkshire police, who might not come off terribly well in the league tables, have really blazed a trail in protecting these unfortunate women, for example, they have established extremely good relationships with the police in Mirpore and Pakistan. In addition, there are some terrific people working in the Foreign Office consular division in Islamabad helping such girls. We are doing all that we can. 
 More recently, my right hon. Friend the Minister for Children issued strong guidelines to social services departments. Since then, the guidelines have been sorted out and thinned down and have been sent to most schools, school governors and education authorities. Such action will help to cut back the 
 number of forced marriages, but if there was a specific criminal offence of forcing to marry, we would start to have a real impact on the perpetrators of these terrible acts, who would realise that they were committing an offence not only against every aspect of Islam, but against our criminal law. I hope that the Minister will tell us that progress is being made and that, eventually, we will have some form of criminal law that will deter such parents—who, I stress, are in a minority. 
 Week after week in my constituency I help young men and women who are very pleased with their arranged, genuine marriages and want to bring their husband or wife into the country; my office and I give them that help. However, a minority of young men and women—nearly always women; men seem to have their own way around these problems—are being forced into marriages. We must win the hearts and minds of those people. To say that forcing another into marriage is a specific criminal offence would go a long way in that direction.

Cheryl Gillan: I am very pleased that the hon. Lady and other Government Members have tabled this group of probing amendments. It is important that we use the course of the Bill to hear the Minister's views on the subject. The hon. Lady is a well known champion on the subject, and although I am in danger of repeating myself, let me say that I take my hat off to her for what she has done for her community. I think that it is much appreciated.
 I first came across the phenomenon of forced marriage in my constituency. A teacher approached me because she did not know what to do about some young women in her class who were going to be taken back to Pakistan to make marriages that they did not want to make. She came to ask if she could bring them to see me separately and in secret. I thought that that was an extraordinary way to behave, but when I saw them and spoke to them I understood the fear and trepidation in which they were living. It was not so much that they wanted me to do anything about their particular cases, but that they wanted me to learn from their experience and to reinforce on the Government—of whatever persuasion—their message that they cannot resist what is going on in their communities unless they have the backing of the Government of the day and some form of legislative protection behind which they can seek refuge. 
 Following the conference in The Hague last month, I was amazed when Scotland Yard's head of homicide, Commander Andy Baker, revealed that the police in London are approached by an average of two women or girls a week who fear being forced into marriage against their will. I think that that is the tip of the iceberg, and if that is what is happening in London, there will be many more cases in our communities throughout the United Kingdom. There is an urgent need for the Government to examine the issue of forced marriages and to go beyond paying the lip service to the problem that we all pay. Hopefully, they will come up with proposals that, at the very least, can be discussed. 
 Turning to honour killings, many cultures place emphasis on so-called honour, but precisely what 
 constitutes honour is quite unclear in many instances. In addition, the concept seems to be entirely differently applied to men and to women. It seems to place men ahead of women, put men in a position of strength and allow them to behave almost as they choose, yet women's behaviour is severely restricted to the point of illogicality. The concept of loss of honour varies from the loss of virginity before marriage to the ridiculous idea prevalent in certain societies that if a woman is raped, that is interpreted as promiscuity and she faces a penalty through no fault of her own: the victim is held responsible. Such is the nature of honour within certain cultures that hit men and women are sent out to deal with offenders. It is very dramatic, and we often read about the results in our newspapers. Reading some of the harrowing stories and seeing the results of so-called honour is alarming. There is a view that only Muslim families are involved, but, in fact, Sikh and Hindu families are as well. Sadly, the practice is widespread. 
 I will be very interested to hear what the Minister has to say. I refer him to an article in Jane's Police Review of 18 June this year in which Dr. Aisha Gill made an interesting case. At the end of the article, Dr. Gill set out a series of suggestions that I hope the Minister will consider. The first is, 
''effective legislation to punish all crimes committed in the name of honour and ensure that all reports of violence and abuse are taken seriously, with action taken''.
 I support the amendments. I will be interested to hear what resources the Minister intends to put into the field and his reaction to the substantial research being done by Scotland Yard and others. What action do the Government intend to take?

Ann Keen: I support the amendments. The purpose of an offence of aiding, abetting or coercing a forced marriage is not in any way to denigrate Asian communities, but to support them in their aim to save and protect their most vulnerable members—boys and girls—from being forced into marriage. There may be few prosecutions under such a provision, but, like the recently passed Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003, it sends a clear message about society's repugnance and determination to stamp out a form of abuse. In addition, the police, schools, the Foreign Office, social services and so forth will feel that they have much stronger grounds for intervening to prevent the offence and aid the victims, and they will have a much stronger duty to intervene and offer services.
 Many families still do not realise that what they are doing is wrong, especially when they exert intense psychological, as distinct from physical, force. The amendment would leave them in no doubt that in this country such practices are illegal. All the religions practised by Asian communities in the UK, in particular Islam, condemn forced marriages. Shaykh Hamza Yusuf Hanson, the leading international Islamic scholar recently took part in a film for young people made by the Home Office in which he makes it clear that forced marriage is abhorrent to Islam and Muslims. Such a provision is therefore far from a manifestation of Islamaphobia; in fact, it upholds the 
 true doctrines of Islam and the Sikh and Hindu religions. 
 It could be said that current criminal provisions have plainly failed to reduce the abuse because they do not cover coercion by psychological pressure. Drafting a provision will not be easy, but it is far from impossible. Perhaps it will be difficult to prove the offence—especially if it a question of the victim's word against the family's—but the same difficulty is faced by many rape and sexual abuse victims and it does not prevent many successful prosecutions. 
 The proposed provision has received total backing from the Association of Chief Police Officers through the domestic violence lead taken by Jim Gamble. The chief constable of Manchester, Mike Todd, spoke out strongly in its favour on 18 June this year, when he described it as a very useful and necessary tool in 
''the Police armoury to combat this from of abuse''.
 I have taken part in many conferences on this subject, and was privileged to host one in my constituency last year, which my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley (Mrs. Cryer) attended. I met District Judge Marilyn Mornington, who with many in the northern circuit, of which she is a member, has worked extremely hard on this issue. Many other brave women have spoken out, not only Southall Black Sisters, but other members of our communities. 
 The Government should not be afraid of introducing the provision. We as politicians have never been afraid of doing what is right. This is without question the time to do what is right for the young people in our communities.

Vera Baird: I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley for the single-mindedness and selflessness with which she pursues these issues on behalf of her Asian community. I suspect that some elements of that community, which dominates her constituency, do not always thank her for doing so, but she continues none the less, and she daily impresses me with her commitment.
 I also pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Isleworth (Ann Keen). I have had the privilege of being in meetings with her in recent weeks, so I know that she is closely involved with the Asian women's community and its specific problems in her constituency. She, too, is a doughty fighter for its rights. 
 On no possible basis of cultural tolerance can the kind of behaviour that has been described be allowed. We are almost at the same stage now with honour killing and forced marriage as we were some years ago with domestic violence, when it was almost a secret and was talked about only by very brave people. When the debate about domestic violence started and we began to tackle the issue, it was only whispered about. That was when it was at its worst. 
 There is an urgent need for these crimes to be named and identified, and it should be made very clear 
 in the legislation that they are unacceptable. I invite the Minister to respond as positively as he can.

Paul Goggins: I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley. She described the work that she has done in the Council of Europe, and we know of her work in this place and admire her for it. These are difficult and complex issues, and she approaches them with characteristic sympathy and courage. I think that all of us would unite in paying tribute to her.
 I made it clear on Second Reading that the Government are sympathetic to the thinking behind new clause 40. We recognise that it is driven by a sense of urgency about the problem, a desire to raise awareness and to get the public to acknowledge that it is important, and a wish to send a clear signal of condemnation. 
 My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) and my hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Isleworth are right that there can be no justification for forced marriages, and I agree that if we can take further steps in the Bill to achieve the goals that we all share, we should take them. 
 I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley for tabling her amendments, which have helped the Committee to focus its attention on this issue. However, what she proposes is not without difficulties. The Government would not generally wish to adopt a measure purely for symbolic reasons. There would have to be real, solid grounds for doing so. I am aware of the Home Office report following the proceedings of the working group on forced marriages that was chaired by Lord Ahmed and Baroness Uddin. It recommended many positive measures, which my hon. Friend welcomed, but it also recommended against the kind of offence that we are discussing. We must at least take account of such opinions. 
 The amendment raises a number of important and complex questions. Can some of the psychological and emotional pressure that is used in certain cases be criminalised without stepping over the borderline into normal family interactions, which the state should hesitate to seek to regulate? Might the fact that an offence has been committed for the purpose of bringing about a forced marriage be treated as an aggravating factor that the court should take into account when sentencing? 
 We will need to think very carefully about all such questions, which is why I will ask my hon. Friend to agree to seek leave to withdraw her amendment, which she has already indicated is a probing amendment. If we decide in the end that a specific offence is required, we will almost certainly need to engage in a formal public consultation on the matter, since such action was not proposed in ''Safety and Justice''. It is only right that we engage the opinions of local communities and others on this issue. In the meantime, I hope that she is reassured that the Government take forced marriage seriously. 
 I was grateful for my hon. Friend's positive comments about the action that the Government are already taking. For example, the Government have published extensive guidance for the police and social services. It has been suggested that that guidance should be backed by section 7 of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970. I understand that my right hon. Friend the Minister for Children is looking sympathetically at that proposal. The ACPO working group on forced marriage has been playing an important, constructive role. Indeed, we have heard this morning about some of the work that it has been doing. 
 A UK-wide working group on forced marriages has been established to bring together voluntary and local agencies throughout the UK to improve grass-roots services to victims and potential victims of forced marriage by working with the police and the Home Office. The Government have also funded a range of educational initiatives, including a training programme at Tower Hamlets college to influence attitudes and practice on forced marriage and, rather imaginatively, a teenage soap opera addressing domestic violence and forced marriage, which will be distributed free to every secondary school. 
 New clause 41 deals with so-called honour crimes. Like all Committee members, I welcome the initiative by the European police meeting in The Hague to consider ways to tackle the rising phenomenon of honour killings. I support its aim to set up a pan-European unit to combat such killings. I also welcome the move by the police in England and Wales to reinvestigate more than 100 murders that they suspect could be honour killings. 
 Although I understand the concerns of my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley, I do not think that her suggestion in the amendment about how to deal with these serious crimes is appropriate, because offenders in honour killings would, in most cases, be subject to the murder sentencing provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which provides that offenders must receive a life sentence and sets out lists of factors that should be taken into account when setting tariffs for those convicted of murder. The Government considered carefully the range of murder offences committed and how they should be included in the tariff framework that we set up. Honour killings do not appear in that schedule, although we believe that the majority of such killings would be likely to fall into the aggravated sentencing ranges.

Dominic Grieve: The Minister is touching on the nub of the issue. It is difficult to see why this category cannot be included, now that it has been highlighted. Although I accept that it may fall within the ''aggravated'' range, I point out that Parliament could choose to make it specific not by introducing this amendment, but by the device that he has mentioned.

Paul Goggins: As I said, we are thinking carefully about all the issues, but we do not believe that honour killings should be described in that way and included in the list. The aggravating factors, which are already covered, would capture these horrendous killings, which are often carried out by family members and
 are generally premeditated. Some of them may be contract killings, and there may sometimes be an abuse of a position of trust. Those are all strong aggravating factors in the legislation that can play into the sentencing for a murder.

Cheryl Gillan: I understood from the reports that I read that the national review dealt with nearly 120 murders, of which 13 were identified as being so-called honour killings. Can the Minister say what lessons were learned from that review and how the information from it will be shared with other police forces? Those are not isolated cases.
 I was pleased to hear that an innovative play would be sent to all secondary schools, but what about the lessons learned from the pilot project? Will that project be spun out across the country? Are there plans to expand it or are there any pointers from it whereby we can learn across the board?

Paul Goggins: The hon. Lady is right that we are learning a great deal, and it will be necessary to spread that learning across police forces throughout the country in a relevant and sensitive way.
 One particular point that we need to think a bit harder about—I am responding partly to my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley in dealing with it—is how the police are able to identify that a killing is a so-called honour killing if we do not have a specific category of honour killings. How could the police deduce from the list of the aggravating factors that a murder was indeed an honour killing? If they are looking for a pattern of offending and trying to get behind what is going on in order to identify the perpetrators and deal not only with an individual case, but with the whole trend of honour killings, they will need to have some way of identifying precisely what is going on. 
 I undertake to have discussions before Report with law enforcement agencies to see how precisely they are able to inform their policing arrangements from what is said at trial and in relation to sentencing, so as to detect further crimes in the future. I know that my hon. Friend is interested in that issue, and I undertake to come back to her on it.

Cheryl Gillan: Will the Minister examine cases in which the deaths were previously thought to be accidental? I gather that they have been included in the review. That might be extremely informative for other police forces and I would be interested in his reaction.

Paul Goggins: We need to look with fresh eyes at all cases that may have been misinterpreted in the past. We need to learn from such cases and spread what we learn throughout the country. As my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley made clear, this is an issue that is deep within communities, but which has only recently surfaced, so there must be a great deal that we can learn. We need to learn quickly and use those lessons practically to bear down on what is a completely unacceptable practice.
 I have not had the opportunity to read in detail the article to which the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs. Gillan) referred. I shall do so, 
 because it clearly contains much important information. We all have a lot to learn about these matters. I undertake to engage with law enforcement agencies between now and Report to find out precisely where they have got to and what further help they need. 
 I hope that, having described the Government's response to both amendments, my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley will agree to seek leave to withdraw the amendment on the clear understanding that we intend to take forward the issue of enforced marriage in the best way that we can.

Ann Cryer: I shall seek to withdraw my amendment, but before I do so, I shall draw together one or two strands that came out of our discussions.
 I understood from the comments made by the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham about the outcomes of the police officers' conference that the 120 killings to which she referred are going to be investigated. I do not think that we know what proportion are honour killings, but we are moving in the right direction in that the police are going to look at those deaths and also at the totally disproportionate number of young women in the Asian community who commit so-called suicide as compared with the number in the white community, as it is four times as great. In addition to accidents, there are suicides. I cannot believe that all those women died because of their own actions. I am certain that many of them took their own lives because of the pressure from their extended family and the community. All that pressure comes from family honour or izzat, which plays such a strong role in those communities. It is difficult for us on the outside to understand what pressures are brought to bear on these girls to make them take their own lives.

Cheryl Gillan: I based my information, probably unwisely, on an article featured in the Evening Standard on 23 June. It said that, of the 120 deaths that the police had so far identified, 13 were suspected cases. If I am incorrect, it is because the information that I got from the newspaper was incorrect. I hoped that it was right.

Ann Cryer: As a well meaning reader of The Guardian, I think that the Evening Standard probably got it right in that there were 120 deaths throughout the country. Many of them occurred in the Met area, but there were also cases from throughout the country.
 On the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Isleworth, when the Department for Constitutional Affairs was the Lord Chancellor's Department, the Under-Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Mr. Leslie), held a range of meetings across the country, particularly in areas where there are ethnic communities. Certainly, a meeting was arranged in Brentford and in Bradford. That is where I came across the formidable District Judge Marilyn Mornington. It was she who had the idea of creating a criminal offence. She comes across many problems relating to the issue and she felt that the creation of a 
 specific criminal offence would be a step in the right direction. 
 Of course we have to consult the communities, but let us talk to women, too, and not just to so-called community leaders. I remember a time in Bradford when if the local authority was asked to consult the community, it meant a particular council official picking up the phone and ringing five named persons in the Pakistani community. That was consultation. We do not want to go down that path. The meetings that the Lord Chancellor's Department organised were excellent. People from all over the country were there, and I met a group of women from Sahela in Cardiff who had some good information. 
 Shortly after the report of the group looking into forced marriages was published, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office set up the FCO community liaison unit with the help of the Home Office. There, a group of people—mainly women—have a hotline for girls in difficulties who either are about to be, or have been, forced to marry. It does some wonderful work. With the combined help of the FCO community liaison unit, our high commissions, MPs who help girls individually, social services, and, in particular, police forces, such as West Yorkshire police, we are moving in the right direction, but what we are not doing is stopping the practice; it is continuing apace. We are simply helping girls in awful situations, but once a girl has been forced into a marriage, her life is in tatters, no matter what we as a society do to help her. For the rest of her life, she is practically cut off from her community and family. Frequently, she even banned from seeing her brothers and sisters. 
 I readily withdraw my amendment, but I hope that the Minister will take into account everything that has been said this morning, particularly about consultation with the community. We must remember that there are women out there who are suffering, so we must listen to what they have to say. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Schedule 7, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 8 - Repeals

Amendments made: No. 113, in schedule 8, page 45, line 3, at end insert— 
'Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 (c.84) 
 Section 7. 
 In section 8— 
 (a) the proviso to subsection (3); 
 (b) in subsection (4), the words from '',except'' to ''courts-martial,''. 
 Schedule 2.'.
 No. 114, in schedule 8, page 45, line 5, at end insert— 
'Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1968 (c.20) 
 In Schedule 3, paragraph 3(b).'. 
 No. 115, in schedule 8, page 45, line 7, at end insert— 
'In Schedule 1, paragraph 4(2).'.
 No. 116, in schedule 8, page 45, line 32, at end insert— 
'Armed Forces Act 1996 (c.46) 
 Section 8. 
 Schedule 2.'. 
 No. 117, in schedule 8, page 45, line 35, at end insert— 
 'Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (c.43) 
 In section 47— 
 (a) in subsection (1), paragraph (d) and the word ''or'' preceding it; 
 (b) in subsection (2), paragraph (c) and the word ''and'' preceding it.'.
 No. 77, in schedule 8, page 45, line 45, column 2, at beginning insert 'Section 69.'. 
 No. 118, in schedule 8, page 45, line 46, at end insert— 
'Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c.42) 
 Section 135(4)(c).'. 
 —[Paul Goggins.]
 Schedule 8, as amended, agreed to. 
 Clause 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 9 - Transitional and transitory provisions

Amendments made: No. 119, in schedule 9, page 47, line 4, after 'Court', insert 'or a court-martial'. 
 No. 120, in schedule 9, page 47, line 7, after 'Appeal', insert— 
'or the Courts-Martial Appeal Court'.
 No. 121, in schedule 9, page 47, line 10, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert— 
'(a) sections (Procedure for determining fitness to plead: England and Wales) and (Procedure for determining fitness to be tried: Northern Ireland); 
 (b) section 17 and Schedule 2; 
 ( ) section (Courts-martial etc) and Schedule (Unfitness to stand trial and insanity: courts-martial etc);'.
 No. 122, in schedule 9, page 47, line 12, leave out '10 to 13' and insert '10A to 13, 32A'. 
 No. 68, in schedule 9, page 47, line 12, leave out 'and 39' and insert ', 39 and 39A'. 
 No. 100, in schedule 9, page 47, line 17, at end insert— 
 'Section (Surcharge payable on conviction) applies only in relation to offences committed on or after the commencement of that section.'.—[Paul Goggins.]
 Schedule 9, as amended, agreed to. 
 Clause 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37 - Orders

Amendment made: No. 94, in clause 37, page 20, line 14, after 'section', insert 
'(Surcharge payable on conviction)(5),'.—[Paul Goggins.]
 Clause 37, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 38 - Extent

Paul Goggins: I beg to move amendment No. 81, in clause 38, page 20, line 18, at end insert—
'(1A) Section [Recovery of criminal injuries compensation from offenders] also extends to Scotland.'.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government new clause 28—Recovery of criminal injuries compensation from offenders.
 Government amendments Nos. 127 and 128.

Paul Goggins: The aim of the new clause is to arm the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority with powers to recover from offenders the money that it has paid in compensation to their victims under the criminal injuries compensation scheme. The new clause would do that by inserting four new sections into the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995, which paved the way to the introduction in 1996 of the present, tariff-based compensation scheme.
 The proposal to give the CICA a right to recover money from offenders was one of several set out in the consultation paper ''Compensation and Support for Victims of Crime'', which was issued on 12 January this year. More than 30 respondents commented on the proposal, the overwhelming majority in favour of it. In the light of that strong support, we decided to give effect to the proposal as soon as possible. We aim to make offenders liable to reimburse the CICA for any money paid out to their victims, and the CICA would be able to pursue the offenders through the civil courts for that money. 
 I will summarise briefly the proposed arrangements. New sections 7A to 7D would be inserted after section 7 of the 1995 Act. They set out that 
''The Secretary of State may, by regulations . . . make provision for the recovery of . . . an amount''
 from an offender 
''equal to all or part of the compensation paid''
 to a victim 
''in respect of a criminal injury.''
 They make it clear that recovery would be possible only when the offender had been convicted of the relevant offence in a criminal court. Such a conviction would establish that the offender was indeed guilty of the offence that led to the victim's injury, which would obviate the need for the CICA to establish guilt in the civil courts. 
 The proposed arrangements would require the CICA to serve a recovery notice on the offender which would set out: first, the amount of liability; secondly, the reasons for the determination and the basis on which it has been made; thirdly, how the money must be repaid; and fourthly, how the alleged offender can object, if he contests either the amount recoverable or that he is the person from whom it should be recovered.

David Heath: Will the Minister make it clear that there is no possibility of an award of compensation to a victim being
 contingent on recovery of that sum from the perpetrator?

Paul Goggins: I can give an absolute assurance. The CICA would make the payment; then, separately, it would be able to use the new powers to recover the money from the offender. However, the one would not be contingent on the other.
 The information that I have just outlined would have to be contained in the notice. That is an important safeguard for an offender. If an offender objects, the arrangements provide that the CICA must formally to review that objection and that that review must be conducted by a person other than the one who took the original decision to issue a recovery notice; that is another important safeguard. If the offender's objection is unsuccessful, or if no objection is lodged, the CICA can then initiate recovery action through the civil courts. In practice, that means that it will seek to recover the money by normal debt recovery action.

Dominic Grieve: I am trying to follow the Minister's comment about people contesting whether they are the right person to pay the sum. One would have thought that, if someone has been convicted of an offence of violence against another, such a contest would be pointless. In what circumstances do the Government envisage an alleged offender contesting whether the order should be made against him?

Paul Goggins: I wish to reflect a little on the detail of that but, for example, there may be complications because somebody of the same name has been convicted in court, or two people in the same family might have the same name. That could create confusion, and in those circumstances the person who is not the person from whom compensation should be sought will be able to defend themselves.

Dominic Grieve: That is an extremely helpful answer, but I want to take this a stage further. It is my understanding that the Minister envisages that in those circumstances a review will be carried out in-house by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, but what if that review still gets the decision wrong? Where does the person concerned get redress under the proposed system if he believes that he is wrongly being required to pay a sum of money?

Paul Goggins: In the civil court. There is an internal arrangement and common sense may well prevail, but if there is a contest that will be resolved in the civil court. I should emphasise that the action will give the offender a further opportunity to object on the grounds set out in the Bill. That is another important safeguard.

Vera Baird: My hon. Friend's last answer has made me think about another situation. If three people are convicted of an offence, will the compensation ordered to be paid to their single victim be apportioned among them, or will each be jointly and severally liable for all of it?

Paul Goggins: Again, I wish to reflect a little on that question. However, the compensation cannot exceed the sum paid out by the criminal injuries compensation
 scheme. Therefore, I assume that the full amount that has been paid out is all that can be recovered, and that that would be apportioned between the three parties. However, if my hon. and learned Friend will forgive me, I will not get into a debate now on an issue that I need to reflect on.

David Heath: That raises another important issue. I do not expect the Minister to answer the question, but where there are co-defendants who are jointly responsible, will the total compensation be apportioned according to an assessment of the contribution of each of them to the injury, or will it simply be apportioned equally between those who are held jointly responsible for the crime? We are getting into complicated areas and we need clear advice about how these things will work.

Paul Goggins: I shall provide more precise advice, but the answer clearly depends on the circumstances of the case.
 Amendment No. 81 is a consequential amendment to clause 38 to make it clear that new clause 28 extends to Scotland. We will need to make a slight further amendment to the new clause to reflect the fact that the Limitation Act 1980, to which clause 7D(4) of the new clause refers, does not apply in Scotland: the relevant Scottish legislation is the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, and we need to add an appropriate reference to it. We will make that necessary technical adjustment on Report. 
 Amendment Nos. 127 and 128 make consequential changes to the long title of the Bill to make it clear that it now includes provision about the recovery by the CICA of compensation from offenders. Those provisions take nothing away from the rights of victims or compromise victims' ability to obtain appropriate redress. A victim will still have the right to sue the person who harmed them for damages through the civil courts. Our intention is to give the CICA a power to get back from offenders the money that it has paid out in compensation to their victims under the compensation scheme. The details of those procedures will be set out in regulations, and they will be updated in the light of experience. All such regulations will require the affirmative resolution. 
 Any compensation recovered, less the costs of recovery, will go through the Consolidated Fund and back to the CICA, which will then be able to use the money to pay compensation to other victims of violent crime. The money will not be kept in the Treasury. I am sure that the Committee would agree that it is right that, wherever possible, offenders be made to pay for the consequences of their crimes. That being the case, it must also be right for the CICA to be armed with the necessary powers to get compensation back from offenders.

Joe Benton: Before I call the next speaker, I want to mention something for the Committee to be thinking about before we get to it. Very shortly we will come to a series of new clauses, which I understand the Clerk has discussed with different bodies. I propose to put new clauses 18 and 19 together and to take new clause 20 separately, because I understand that it may be opposed. Then we have to
 deal with new clauses 21, 23 to 29 and 35 to 38. New clauses 43 and 44, which are a little further on, will also be taken together. If there is any problem with that suggestion, will hon. Members please let me know during the next couple of debates?

Dominic Grieve: Thank you, Mr. Benton.
 Let me say at the outset that the principle of what the Minister is seeking to achieve in new clause 28 will command acceptance across the Committee and, indeed, on both sides of the House. Therefore, I hope that he will excuse me if I examine the proposal in a little detail, because good intentions can have unintended consequences when they are translated into statute, and there are one or two issues on which I would like to get clarification. 
 As the Minister is aware, the proposal has been introduced at a late stage of the Bill's passage, so there has not been the opportunity to consider carefully its implications. I apologise to him if I raise issues to which he knows the answers. Has an assessment been made of the likely financial benefits that will flow from the proposal? We know that a large proportion of offenders—by no means all—come from a category of individuals who lead chaotic lifestyles and have few financial resources. Often, therefore, the chance of recovering any sensible sum will be small, but the resources that have to be put into achieving recovery may be considerable until one ascertains that the person does not have any money that one can lay one's hands on. Has an assessment been made of the cost effectiveness of the proposal? I realise that that might be a difficult thing to do, but one would hope that someone within a Department has done a few forward projections and estimated what the measure will generate. Without that, there is a serious danger that we could end up with a sum recovered that is neutral or negative when balanced against the resources that need to be put into the process of recovery. I would be grateful if the Minister could help me on that. 
 The Minister said that the money would not be kept in the Treasury, but will the Treasury keep the interest on the money that is acquired, or will the benefit of that also go to the fund in order to build it up? I would be grateful if the Minister told us about that. In my experience, the interest on money held tends to be important, especially when the sums are large. It would be useful for the Committee to know what will happen in that respect. 
 Some of the nub issues were touched on in interventions. In a straightforward case, if a person had been convicted of bludgeoning another with a piece of wood and was serving a term of imprisonment, but had a car and a house waiting for him on his release, one would expect few problems if action was taken to recover the assessed sum to compensate the victim; but if there are co-defendants, will the liability be joint and several, or joint, so that there has to be apportionment? How will the determination system work? 
 What happens if a person does not like how the review of a recovery determination has been carried out? The Minister told me that in such cases, there 
 would be a contest in the civil courts, which surprised me, because if as a result of a review a debt is established as being due and owing from a person as if it were under a civil judgment, the matter of whether it is owed will not subsequently be reviewed by the civil courts. In such circumstances, the only mechanism open to a person would be a judicial review of the recovery determination. Can the Minister clarify that? It is important for the Committee to understand the mechanisms. 
 On damages from the civil courts, the Minister said that a person would not be prevented by the scheme from seeking damages from the offender concerned under ordinary civil recovery provisions for tort. However, if that person does so, how will it affect the situation in respect of the board? Let us suppose that the compensation scheme has paid £500,000 to a person who has suffered serious, traumatic injuries and been left permanently handicapped. The scheme would recover that money from the offender, but what happens if the person brings civil proceedings against the offender? Will the offender pay out a second time under the civil recovery mechanism, or is something else envisaged? It would be helpful if the Minister clarified that, because it is not clear in the Bill. 
 Subject to those comments, I welcome the broad principle.

David Heath: I apologise to the Committee for being late. I was carrying out parliamentary duties in Edinburgh and although I left at quarter-past five this morning, it was insufficiently early to get to the Committee on time.
 I have no problem with the principle behind the proposal, but a lot of thought needs to go into the implementation. My principal area of concern has been outlined in interventions and by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve). There is a real problem with the apportionment in cases involving co-defendants who have been found guilty of offences that constitute an assault, for example. The Minister made it clear that the amount sought in compensation could not exceed the amount given to the victim, so we have a quantum of compensation. 
 Given that it would be manifestly unfair if the compensation were to be recovered from only one co-defendant, there is a need for apportionment, but who is to do that, and on what grounds? Will the authority accept that where several people are jointly responsible for injuries, the compensation sum should be shared out arithmetically, or will there be an attempt to establish who was responsible for a particular kick, or blow to the head, and so on, that caused the injury for which compensation is paid? If the latter, there will be a complex process of arbitration that will almost certainly be challenged, and we will be entering a new area. As I said, although I have no difficulty with the principle, I believe that implementation will be difficult. 
 I am insufficiently knowledgeable about whether there are criminal offences occasioning compensation through the criminal injuries compensation scheme that could be caused by a corporate body rather than ''a person'', meaning an individual. I am trying to 
 think of an instance. Many of us have long argued that there should be an offence of corporate manslaughter, but we have not quite got there yet. Should there be provision for bodies corporate, or are they covered by the word ''person'', meaning a legal person? Perhaps the Minister can assist me with that. 
 The Minister may also be able to tell us whether the Home Office has any intention of amending the terms of the criminal injuries compensation scheme. There is a great deal of concern outside the House that plans are afoot to remove the lower bands from the scheme. Many are extremely concerned about the effect that that will have on victims. It would be a most retrograde step if that were to be combined with this measure in a way that purports to assist the victim, but in fact assists only the Treasury.

Dominic Grieve: I refrained from raising that issue, because it was not directly germane to the amendment. However, I, too, would be delighted if the Minister took this opportunity to clear up the matter.

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman was much better behaved than I in deciding that the matter was not germane to the amendment. It would be helpful if the Minister was as explicit as possible on the subject. If there are proposals for change, the sooner the House knows about them the better. Many people will be concerned if there are to be retrograde moves, as we suspect there will be.
 I look forward to hearing what the Minister says, and acknowledge that he might wish to deal with apportionment in writing and explain more fully on Report. I would entirely accept that, if it were necessary, because we seem to have raised issues that have not yet been thought through—or if they have, the results of that thought have not yet been communicated to the Minister.

Vera Baird: I, too, welcome the proposal, and have some queries that are closely related to each other.
 The criminal injuries compensation scheme has its own internal appellate structures and they are often used for issues of quantum. It can take a considerable time to settle on the appropriate payment to a victim because the authorities have to look at issues such as how long the trauma lasted and the extent of the injury. I have noted that the limitation period does not start until compensation is paid. After that, the state may embark on the job of recovering from the perpetrator the compensation that is to be paid. I heard clearly in the reply given earlier that there is no contingency in terms of getting the amount. I would like reassurance that there is no question of the victim waiting until the action against the perpetrator is triggered and completed to receive her payout, as that could be a long wait. 
 Another issue, which is closely linked, is the right—proper, I suppose—of the perpetrator to seek a review under proposed new section 7B. Under subsection (2)(e) of that new section, there is provision for review of both the determination that an amount is recoverable, and the amount determined to be recoverable. Therefore, the review can be not just 
 about whether the person is the right chap, which is all that we thought of under proposed new section 7B(1), but about the amount to be recovered from him. What is that about? Is the provision only about apportionment, so that if there are two sums and the claims officer has said that the person should pay all of it, it can be argued that he should pay only half? Is that what the right to discuss the sum on review is about? I would not want it to be about any reopening of the quantum that the CICA has already decided should be paid out to the victim, because that will have been fixed and settled, and it ought to have been paid out by the time that this stage is reached. It would greatly concern me if, ex post that occurring, the perpetrator were able to bring forward fresh medical evidence to suggest that the victim was not as traumatised as she had suggested, or anything of that kind.

Dominic Grieve: Proposed new section 7D(2)(b) refers to the defence
''that the compensation paid was not determined in accordance with the Scheme''.
 That raises the possibility of saying that there has been a poor or wrongful determination of the amount. How far that extends is difficult to tell.

Vera Baird: The hon. Gentleman is echoing my wish that it should be made completely clear that once somebody has got their award it will not be changed by the intervention of the perpetrator, when what is intended is only to recover the award that has been made from him.

Paul Goggins: There have been a number of interesting questions. I compliment the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) on looking remarkably fresh after a 5.15 am start from Edinburgh.
 I am grateful to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield for making it plain from the outset that he had no quibble with the principle of the proposal but wanted to raise some issues of detail. That is what Committee is supposed to do. He mentioned again that the proposals were brought forward at a late stage. We have rehearsed the reasons for that on a number of occasions, but it is worth repeating that that was because there was a consultation that began in January and concluded only earlier this summer. We were able to respond to that on Second Reading, and I am pleased that we can use the Bill as an opportunity to advance this set of proposals. 
 The hon. Gentleman asked about the financial benefit that might accrue from the measure. I assure him that cases will only be pursued where the value of what is recovered exceeds the cost of recovering it—in other words, where there is a net gain from the process. Decisions will sometimes reflect the ability of the individual to pay, and at other times the amount of money that we are seeking to recover. However, nothing is recovered at present; as soon as we implement these procedures, more money will be raised and more money will be made available to the CICA. I also assure the hon. Gentleman that the Treasury will keep neither the money nor the interest 
 that will be added to the money that is paid into the Consolidated Fund. 
 The hon. Gentleman and others raised a number of questions about the civil courts. An offender will be able to raise the defences set out in proposed new section 7D in enforcement proceedings in the county court or the sheriff court. He can contest on the grounds that he has not been convicted of the offence, 
''(b) that the compensation paid was not determined in accordance with the Scheme; or 
 (c) that the amount determined as recoverable from him was not determined in accordance with regulations under section 7A.''
 I say to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar that there could be a challenge to the amount that has been determined on the grounds of apportionment, as in the example that she gave, or the argument could simply be that the figures are wrong. However, I give her an absolute assurance that that could not lead to a reopening of the question of quantum—in other words, to a reopening of the case. That cannot happen. All we are talking about is the CICA being able to recover money after it has paid out a sum as an award. It will be possible for the offender to challenge things through the civil courts in the way that we are setting out, but it will not be possible for the original case to be reopened.

Dominic Grieve: I have another question for the Minister. The answer must be obvious, but it is not made obvious in the provisions. What will happen where someone is convicted of an offence, several tens of thousands of pounds in compensation is paid to the victim, the sum is recovered from the convicted person, and three years later the Court of Appeal overturns his conviction? I assume that at that point he will get his money back, but the clause does not make provision for that. Although that might not happen very often, we can say with certainty that it will happen at some point.

Paul Goggins: The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point that I shall have to think about further. It appears to be logical that where someone's conviction is overturned the amount that has been recovered should be paid back, but I shall check that and write to the hon. Gentleman. If he has put his finger on a difficult issue, he will see on Report that we have taken account of his point.
 Just to finish my remarks on the civil courts, an offender will be able to challenge the CICA's assessment before a tribunal with full jurisdiction, as is required by article 6 of the European convention on human rights. 
 On the apportionment question, I emphasise again that that will depend on the specific case being dealt with. However, I repeat that the amount claimed back cannot exceed the amount that has been paid out as an award. For example, where £1,000 compensation has been to the victim, and the award is of £2,000, the CICA will claim the difference between the two: £1,000. It will not be possible to exceed the full amount. I am happy to write to hon. Members in a little more detail about apportionment if that would be helpful. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for 
 Redcar is clearly concerned that the victim could lose out because of the additional step in the process, but I emphasise that it is a further step beyond the existing system. These proposals will not in any way delay the process by which the victim is paid out an award. That will not change as a result of these measures, all of which will come in after the process as it stands at the moment. 
 The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome mentioned corporate responsibility. As an example, if a care home is responsible for an injury through lack of care, the CICA could effect recovery from that care home. Corporate accountability is built in to the measures. 
 The hon. Members for Somerton and Frome and for Beaconsfield mentioned the criminal injuries compensation scheme. I emphasise that nothing in today's proposals has a bearing on the scheme as a whole. They are entirely additional. Of course, the Government keep the scheme under review, and if there were at any stage proposals to change it, the House would be notified in the normal way and we would have the normal debates, because change in regulation would be required. That can be done only in the House.

Dominic Grieve: At one point I was distracted from the Minister's remarks, so I may have missed what he said, but I asked for clarification of the relationship between the compensation scheme and civil proceedings. How will that work in respect of double recovery from a defendant of money through the scheme and money through civil proceedings? Did he answer my question on that? If he did so, I missed it and I apologise.

Paul Goggins: I may not have dealt with the point in sufficient detail. I shall write to the hon. Gentleman about that issue, but for the purposes of this debate, I emphasise that there cannot be double payment or counting. There can be only the one figure, and I emphasise very strongly that it cannot be paid twice. That is very important.
 I repeat that if any changes were made or proposed to the scheme, they would be brought forward in the normal way. We are certainly not introducing anything to change the scheme this morning. It is worth bearing in mind that in the current year, the CICA will have about £163 million at its disposal to pay out in awards. That figure will be added to by the measures that we are proposing. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 83, in clause 38, page 20, line 28, at end insert— 
'section [Victims of mentally disordered persons: Northern Ireland].'.
 No. 58, in clause 38, page 20, line 28, at end insert— 
'section (Procedure for determining fitness to be tried: Northern Ireland).'.
 No. 105, in clause 38, page 20, line 32, after 'Schedule', insert 
'(Unfitness to stand trial and insanity: courts-martial etc),'.
 No. 59, in clause 38, page 20, leave out lines 34 and 35.—[Paul Goggins.] 
 Clause 38, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 39 - Short title

Paul Goggins: I beg to move amendment No. 60, in clause 39, page 20, line 38, leave out subsection (2).
 This is a technical amendment to remove the Lords privilege amendment to clause 39 that was inserted when the Bill moved from the Lords to the Commons. Committee members are aware that the House of Lords cannot consider matters of money and charges on the public funds. Therefore, this amendment was inserted. Following Second Reading, this House passed a money resolution for the Bill.

Cheryl Gillan: In another place on 4 March, my noble Friend Baroness Anelay of St. Johns complained that amendments had been tabled at the last minute and that the other place did not have enough time to consider them properly. Likewise, on 1 July, I raised a point of order that was ruled on by the Chair.
 I want to use this Government amendment to ask the Minister whether he has had a chance to consider the major amendments that have been added to the Bill, and whether he will accept a recommittal in the other place to allow the Lords to consider the new amendments properly.

Paul Goggins: I am pleased to respond. The question of recommittal is not for me; as the hon. Lady is aware, these issues are discussed in the usual channels.
 We are content that, although some of the amendments came a little late in the day, the reasons why are clear. There has been straightforward agreement about the principle, and we have already tried this morning to get to grips with some of the detail. That can continue in the period up to Report. I do not think that anybody can argue that there is insufficient opportunity to discuss the detail. The question of recommittal is a matter for others. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Clause 39, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New clause 18 - Evidence and procedure: England and Wales

'(1) Subsections (2) to (4) apply where a person (''the defendant'') is charged in the same proceedings with an offence of murder or manslaughter and with an offence under section 5 in respect of the same death (''the section 5 offence''). 
 (2) Where by virtue of section 35(3) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c.33) a court or jury is permitted, in relation to the section 5 offence, to draw such inferences as appear proper from the defendant's failure to give evidence or refusal to answer a question, the court or jury may also draw such inferences in determining whether he is guilty— 
 (a) of murder or manslaughter, or 
 (b) of any other offence of which he could lawfully be convicted on the charge of murder or manslaughter, 
 even if there would otherwise be no case for him to answer in relation to that offence. 
 (3) The charge of murder or manslaughter is not to be dismissed under paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c.37) (unless the section 5 offence is dismissed). 
 (4) At the defendant's trial the question whether there is a case for the defendant to answer on the charge of murder or manslaughter is not to be considered before the close of all the evidence (or, if at some earlier time he ceases to be charged with the section 5 offence, before that earlier time). 
 (5) An offence under section 5 is an offence of homicide for the purposes of the following enactments— 
 sections 24 and 25 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (c.43) (mode of trial of child or young person for indictable offence); 
 section 51A of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c.37) (sending cases to the Crown Court: children and young persons); 
 section 8 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (c.6) (power and duty to remit young offenders to youth courts for sentence).'.—[Paul Goggins.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 19 - Evidence and procedure: Northern Ireland

'(1) Subsections (2) to (4) apply where a person (''the defendant'') is charged in the same proceedings with an offence of murder or manslaughter and with an offence under section 5 in respect of the same death (''the section 5 offence''). 
 (2) Where by virtue of Article 4(4) of the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 (S.I.1988/1987(N.I.20)) a court or jury is permitted, in relation to the section 5 offence, to draw such inferences as appear proper from the defendant's failure to give evidence or refusal to answer a question, the court or jury may also draw such inferences in determining whether he is guilty— 
 (a) of murder or manslaughter, or 
 (b) of any other offence of which he could lawfully be convicted on the charge of murder or manslaughter, 
 even if there would otherwise be no case for him to answer in relation to that offence. 
 (3) Where a magistrates' court is considering under Article 37 of the Magistrates' Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I.1981/1675 (N.I.26)) whether to commit the defendant for trial for the offence of murder or manslaughter, if there is sufficient evidence to put him upon trial for the section 5 offence there is deemed to be sufficient evidence to put him upon trial for the offence of murder or manslaughter. 
 (4) At the defendant's trial the question whether there is a case to answer on the charge of murder or manslaughter is not to be considered before the close of all the evidence (or, if at some earlier time he ceases to be charged with the section 5 offence, before that earlier time). 
 (5) An offence under section 5 is an offence of homicide for the purposes of the following provisions— 
 Article 17 of the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (S.I.1998/1504(N.I.9)) (mode of trial of child for indictable offence); 
 Article 32 of that Order (power and duty to remit children to youth courts for sentence).'.—[Paul Goggins.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 20 - Procedure for determining fitness to plead: England and Wales

'(1) The Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 (c.84) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In section 4 (finding of unfitness to plead), in subsection (5) (question of fitness to be determined by a jury), for the words from ''by a jury'' to the end substitute ''by the court without a jury''. 
 (3) In subsection (6) of that section, for ''A jury'' substitute ''The court''. 
 (4) In subsection (1) of section 4A (finding that the accused did the act or omission charged against him), for ''jury'' substitute ''court''. 
 (5) For subsection (5) of that section substitute— 
 ''(5) Where the question of disability was determined after arraignment of the accused, the determination under subsection(2) is to be made by the jury by whom he was being tried.'' '. 
 —[Paul Goggins.]
 Brought up, and read the First time. 
 Motion made, and Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 11, Noes 5.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 21 - Procedure for determining fitness to be tried: Northern Ireland

'(1) The Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 (S.I. 1986/595 (N.I.4) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In Article 49 (finding of unfitness to be tried), in paragraph (4) (question of fitness to be determined by a jury), for the words from ''by a jury'' to the end substitute ''by the court without a jury''. 
 (3) In paragraph (4A) of that Article, for ''A jury'' substitute ''The court''. 
 (4) In paragraph (1) of Article 49A (finding that the accused did the act or omission charged against him), for ''jury'' substitute ''court''. 
 (5) For paragraph (5) of that Article substitute— 
 ''(5) Where the question of fitness to be tried was determined after arraignment of the accused, the determination under paragraph (2) is to be made by the jury by whom he was being tried.'' '.—[Paul Goggins.]
 Brought up, and read the First time. 
 Motion made, and Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 11, Noes 5.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 23 - Victims of persons sentenced to imprisonment or detention

'(1) This section applies if— 
 (a) a court convicts a person (''the offender'') of a sexual or violent offence, and 
 (b) a relevant sentence is imposed on him in respect of the offence. 
 (2) But section [Victims of persons subject to hospital direction and limitation direction] applies (instead of this section) if a hospital direction and a limitation direction are given in relation to the offender. 
 (3) The local probation board for the area in which the sentence is imposed must take all reasonable steps to ascertain whether a person who appears to the board to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence wishes— 
 (a) to make representations about the matters specified in subsection (4); 
 (b) to receive the information specified in subsection (5). 
 (4) The matters are— 
 (a) whether the offender should be subject to any licence conditions or supervision requirements in the event of his release; 
 (b) if so, what licence conditions or supervision requirements. 
 (5) The information is information about any licence conditions or supervision requirements to which the offender is to be subject in the event of his release. 
 (6) If a person whose wishes have been ascertained under subsection (3) makes representations to the local probation board mentioned in that subsection or the relevant local probation board about a matter specified in subsection (4), the relevant local probation board must forward those representations to the persons responsible for determining the matter. 
 (7) If a local probation board has ascertained under subsection (3) that a person wishes to receive the information specified in subsection (5), the relevant local probation board must take all reasonable steps— 
 (a) to inform the person whether or not the offender is to be subject to any licence conditions or supervision requirements in the event of his release, 
 (b) if he is, to provide the person with details of any licence conditions or supervision requirements which relate to contact with the victim or his family, and 
 (c) to provide the person with such other information as the relevant local probation board considers appropriate in all the circumstances of the case. 
 (8) The relevant local probation board is— 
 (a) in a case where the offender is to be supervised on release by an officer of a local probation board, that local probation board; 
 (b) in any other case, the local probation board for the area in which the prison or other place in which the offender is detained is situated.'.—[Paul Goggins.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 24 - Victims of persons subject to hospital order with restriction order

'(1) This section applies if the conditions in subsections (2) and (3) are met. 
 (2) The first condition is that one of these applies in respect of a person (''the patient'') charged with a sexual or violent offence— 
 (a) the patient is convicted of the offence; 
 (b) a verdict is returned that the patient is not guilty of the offence by reason of insanity; 
 (c) a finding is made— 
 (i) under section 4 of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 (c.84) that the patient is under a disability, and 
 (ii) under section 4A of that Act that he did the act or made the omission charged against him as the offence. 
 (3) The second condition is that a hospital order with a restriction order is made in respect of the patient by a court dealing with him for the offence. 
 (4) The local probation board for the area in which the determination mentioned in subsection (2)(a), (b) or (c) is made must take all reasonable steps to ascertain whether a person who appears to the board to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence wishes— 
 (a) to make representations about the matters specified in subsection (5); 
 (b) to receive the information specified in subsection (6). 
 (5) The matters are— 
 (a) whether the patient should be subject to any conditions in the event of his discharge from hospital; 
 (b) if so, what conditions. 
 (6) The information is information about any conditions to which the patient is to be subject in the event of his discharge from hospital. 
 (7) If a person whose wishes have been ascertained under subsection (4) makes representations to the local probation board mentioned in that subsection or the relevant local probation board about a matter specified in subsection (5), the relevant local probation board must forward those representations to the persons responsible for determining the matter. 
 (8) If a local probation board has ascertained under subsection (4) that a person wishes to receive the information specified in subsection (6), the relevant local probation board must take all reasonable steps— 
 (a) to inform the person whether or not the patient is to be subject to any conditions in the event of his discharge, 
 (b) if he is, to provide the person with details of any conditions which relate to contact with the victim or his family, 
 (c) if the restriction order in respect of the patient is to cease to have effect, to notify the person of the date on which it is to cease to have effect, and 
 (d) to provide the person with such other information as the relevant local probation board considers appropriate in all the circumstances of the case. 
 (9) The duties in subsections (7) and (8) apply only while the restriction order is in force. 
 (10) The relevant local probation board is— 
 (a) if the patient is to be discharged subject to a condition that he reside in a particular area, the local probation board for the area; 
 (b) in any other case, the local probation board for the area in which the hospital in which the patient is detained is situated.'.—[Paul Goggins.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 25 - Victims of persons subject to hospital direction and limitation direction

'(1) This section applies if— 
 (a) a person (''the offender'') is convicted of a sexual or violent offence, 
 (b) a relevant sentence is imposed on him in respect of the offence, and 
 (c) a hospital direction and a limitation direction are given in relation to him by a court dealing with him for the offence. 
 (2) The local probation board for the area in which the hospital direction is given must take all reasonable steps to ascertain whether a person who appears to the board to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence wishes— 
 (a) to make representations about the matters specified in subsection (3); 
 (b) to receive the information specified in subsection (4). 
 (3) The matters are— 
 (a) whether the offender should, in the event of his discharge from hospital, be subject to any conditions and, if so, what conditions; 
 (b) whether the offender should, in the event of his release from hospital, be subject to any licence conditions or supervision requirements and, if so, what licence conditions or supervision requirements; 
 (c) if the offender is transferred to a prison or other institution in which he might have been detained if he had not been removed to hospital, whether he should, in the event of his release from prison or another such institution, be subject to any licence conditions or supervision requirements and, if so, what licence conditions or supervision requirements. 
 (4) The information is— 
 (a) information about any conditions to which the offender is to be subject in the event of his discharge; 
 (b) information about any licence conditions or supervision requirements to which the offender is to be subject in the event of his release. 
 (5) If a person whose wishes have been ascertained under subsection (2) makes representations to the local probation board mentioned in that subsection or the relevant local probation board about a matter specified in subsection (3)(a), the relevant local probation board must forward those representations to the persons responsible for determining the matter. 
 (6) If a local probation board has ascertained under subsection (2) that a person wishes to receive the information specified in subsection (4)(a), the relevant local probation board must take all reasonable steps— 
 (a) to inform the person whether or not the offender is to be subject to any conditions in the event of his discharge, 
 (b) if he is, to provide the person with details of any conditions which relate to contact with the victim or his family, 
 (c) if the limitation direction in respect of the offender is to cease to have effect, to notify the person of the date on which it is to cease to have effect, and 
 (d) to provide the person with such other information as the relevant local probation board considers appropriate in all the circumstances of the case. 
 (7) The duties in subsections (5) and (6) apply only while the limitation direction is in force. 
 (8) If a person whose wishes have been ascertained under subsection (2) makes representations to the local probation board mentioned in that subsection or the relevant local probation board about a matter specified in subsection (3)(b) or (c), the relevant local probation board must forward those representations to the persons responsible for determining the matter. 
 (9) If a local probation board has ascertained under subsection (2) that a person wishes to receive the information specified in subsection (4)(b), the relevant local probation board must take all reasonable steps— 
 (a) to inform the person whether or not the offender is to be subject to any licence conditions or supervision requirements in the event of his release, 
 (b) if he is, to provide the person with details of any licence conditions or supervision requirements which relate to contact with the victim or his family, and 
 (c) to provide the person with such other information as the relevant local probation board considers appropriate in all the circumstances of the case. 
 (10) The relevant local probation board is— 
 (a) in a case where the offender is to be discharged from hospital subject to a condition that he reside in a particular area, the local probation board for that area; 
 (b) in a case where the offender is to be supervised on release by an officer of a local probation board, that local probation board; 
 (c) in any other case, the local probation board for the area in which the hospital, prison or other place in which the offender is detained is situated.'.—[Paul Goggins.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 26 - Victims of persons subject to transfer direction and restriction direction

'(1) This section applies if— 
 (a) a person (''the offender'') is convicted of a sexual or violent offence, 
 (b) a relevant sentence is imposed on him in respect of the offence, and 
 (c) while the offender is serving the sentence, the Secretary of State gives a transfer direction and a restriction direction in respect of him. 
 (2) The local probation board for the area in which the hospital specified in the transfer direction is situated must take all reasonable steps to ascertain whether a person who appears to the board to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence wishes— 
 (a) to make representations about the matters specified in subsection (3); 
 (b) to receive the information specified in subsection (4). 
 (3) The matters are— 
 (a) whether the offender should be subject to any conditions in the event of his discharge from hospital; 
 (b) if so, what conditions. 
 (4) The information is information about any conditions to which the offender is to be subject in the event of his discharge from hospital. 
 (5) If a person whose wishes have been ascertained under subsection (2) makes representations to the local probation board mentioned in that subsection or the relevant local probation board about a matter specified in subsection (3), the relevant local probation board must forward the representations to the persons responsible for determining the matter. 
 (6) If a local probation board has ascertained under subsection (2) that a person wishes to receive the information specified in subsection (4), the relevant local probation board must take all reasonable steps— 
 (a) to inform the person whether or not the offender is to be subject to any conditions in the event of his discharge, 
 (b) if he is, to provide the person with details of any conditions which relate to contact with the victim or his family, 
 (c) if the restriction direction in respect of the offender is to cease to have effect, to notify the person of the date on which it is to cease to have effect, and 
 (d) to provide the person with such other information as the relevant local probation board considers appropriate in all the circumstances of the case. 
 (7) The duties in subsections (5) and (6) apply only while the restriction direction is in force. 
 (8) The relevant local probation board is— 
 (a) if the offender is to be discharged subject to a condition that he reside in a particular area, the local probation board for the area; 
 (b) in any other case, the local probation board for the area in which the hospital in which the offender is detained is situated.'.—[Paul Goggins.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 27 - Representations and information: interpretation

'(1) In sections [Victims of persons sentenced to imprisonment or detention] to [Victims of persons subject to transfer direction and restriction direction]— 
 ''court'' does not include a court-martial or the Courts-Martial Appeal Court; 
 ''hospital direction'' has the meaning given in section 45A(3)(a) of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20); 
 ''hospital order'' has the meaning given in section 37(4) of that Act; 
 ''licence condition'' means a condition in a licence; 
 ''limitation direction'' has the meaning given in section 45A(3)(b) of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20); 
 ''local probation board'' means a local probation board established under section 4 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (c.43); 
 ''relevant sentence'' means any of these— 
 (a) a sentence of imprisonment for a term of 12 months or more; 
 (b) a sentence of detention during Her Majesty's pleasure; 
 (c) a sentence of detention for a period of 12 months or more under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (c.6) (offenders under 18 convicted of certain serious offences); 
 (d) a detention and training order for a term of 12 months or more; 
 ''restriction direction'' has the meaning given in section 49(2) of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20); 
 ''restriction order'' has the meaning given in section 41(1) of that Act; 
 ''supervision requirements'' means requirements specified in a notice under section 103(6) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (c.6); 
 ''transfer direction'' has the meaning given in section 47(1) of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20). 
 (2) An offence is a sexual or violent offence if it is any of these— 
 (a) murder or an offence specified in Schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c.44); 
 (b) an offence in respect of which the patient or offender is subject to the notification requirements of Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c.42); 
 (c) an offence against a child within the meaning of Part 2 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (c.43).'.—[Paul Goggins.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 28 - Recovery of criminal injuries compensation

'(1) The Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 (c.53) is amended as follows. 
 (2) After section 7 insert— 
 ''7A Recovery of compensation from offenders: general 
 (1) The Secretary of State may, by regulations made by statutory instrument, make provision for the recovery from an appropriate person of an amount equal to all or part of the compensation paid in respect of a criminal injury. 
 (2) An appropriate person is a person who has been convicted of an offence in respect of the criminal injury. 
 (3) The amount recoverable from a person under the regulations must be determined by reference only to the extent to which the 
criminal injury is directly attributable to an offence of which he has been convicted. 
 (4) The regulations may confer functions in respect of recovery on— 
 (a) claims officers; 
 (b) if a Scheme manager has been appointed, persons appointed by the Scheme manager under section 3(4)(a). 
 (5) The regulations may not authorise the recovery of an amount in respect of compensation from a person to the extent that the compensation has been repaid in accordance with the Scheme. 
 7B Recovery notices 
 (1) If, under regulations made under section 7A(1), an amount has been determined as recoverable from a person, he must be given a notice (a ''recovery notice'') in accordance with the regulations which— 
 (a) requires him to pay that amount, and 
 (b) contains the information mentioned in subsection (2). 
 (2) The information is— 
 (a) the reasons for the determination that an amount is recoverable from the person; 
 (b) the basis on which the amount has been determined; 
 (c) the way in which and the date before which the amount is required to be paid; 
 (d) the means by which the amount may be recovered if it is not paid in accordance with the notice; 
 (e) the grounds on which and the procedure by means of which he may seek a review if he objects to— 
 (i) the determination that an amount is recoverable from him; 
 (ii) the amount determined as recoverable from him. 
 (3) The Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument amend subsection (2) by— 
 (a) adding information; 
 (b) omitting information; 
 (c) changing the description of information. 
 7C Review of recovery determinations 
 (1) Regulations under section 7A(1) shall include provision for the review, in such circumstances as may be prescribed by the regulations, of— 
 (a) a determination that an amount is recoverable from a person; 
 (b) the amount determined as recoverable from a person. 
 (2) A person from whom an amount has been determined as recoverable under the regulations may seek such a review only on the grounds— 
 (a) that he has not been convicted of an offence to which the injury is directly attributable; 
 (b) that the compensation paid was not determined in accordance with the Scheme; 
 (c) that the amount determined as recoverable from him was not determined in accordance with the regulations. 
 (3) Any such review must be conducted by a person other than the person who made the determination under review. 
 (4) The person conducting any such review may— 
 (a) set aside the determination that the amount is recoverable; 
 (b) reduce the amount determined as recoverable; 
 (c) increase the amount determined as recoverable; 
 (d) determine to take no action under paragraphs (a) to (c). 
 (5) But the person conducting any such review may increase the amount determined as recoverable if (but only if) it appears to that person that the interests of justice require the amount to be increased. 
 7D Recovery proceedings 
 (1) An amount determined as recoverable from a person under regulations under section 7A(1) is recoverable from him as a debt due to the Crown if (but only if)— 
 (a) he has been given a recovery notice in accordance with the regulations which complies with the requirements of section 7B, and 
 (b) he has failed to pay the amount in accordance with the notice. 
 (2) In any proceedings for the recovery of the amount from a person, it is a defence for the person to show— 
 (a) that he has not been convicted of an offence to which the injury is directly attributable; 
 (b) that the compensation paid was not determined in accordance with the Scheme; or 
 (c) that the amount determined as recoverable from him was not determined in accordance with regulations under section 7A. 
 (3) In any such proceedings, except for the purposes of subsection (2)(b), no question may be raised or finding made as to the amount that was, or ought to have been, the subject of an award. 
 (4) For the purposes of section 9 of the Limitation Act 1980 (time limit for actions for sums recoverable by statute to run from date on which cause of action accrued) the cause of action to recover that amount shall be taken to have accrued— 
 (a) on the date on which the compensation was paid; or 
 (b) if later, on the date on which a person from whom an amount is sought to be recovered was convicted of an offence to which the injury is directly attributable. 
 (5) If that person is convicted of more than one such offence and the convictions are made on different dates, the reference in subsection (4)(b) to the date on which he was convicted of such an offence shall be taken to be a reference to the earlier or earliest (as the case may be) of the dates on which he was convicted of such an offence.''. 
 (3) In section 9(7) (financial provisions: sums payable into Consolidated Fund), after ''section 3(1)(c)'' insert '', or by virtue of regulations made under section 7A(1),''. 
 (4) In section 11, after subsection (8) insert— 
 ''(8A) No regulations under section 7A(1) or order under section 7B(3) shall be made unless a draft of the regulations or order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.''.'.—[Paul Goggins.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 29 - Victims of mentally disordered persons: Northern Ireland

'(1) The Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 (c.26) is amended as follows. 
 (2) After section 69 (views on temporary release) insert— 
 ''69A Information about discharge and leave of absence of mentally disordered persons 
 (1) The Secretary of State must make a scheme requiring the Secretary of State to make available to persons falling within subsection (2) information about— 
 (a) the discharge from hospital of, or 
 (b) the grant of leave of absence from hospital to, 
 persons in respect of whom relevant determinations have been made. 
 (2) The persons referred to in subsection (1) are victims of the offences in respect of which the determinations were made who wish to receive the information. 
 (3) A relevant determination is made in respect of a person if— 
 (a) a hospital order with a restriction order is made in respect of him by a court dealing with him for an offence, or 
 (b) a transfer direction and a restriction direction are given in respect of him while he is serving a sentence of imprisonment in respect of an offence. 
 (4) The Secretary of State may from time to time make a new scheme or alterations to a scheme. 
 (5) The information to be made available under a scheme must include information as to any relevant conditions to which a person in respect of whom a relevant determination has been made is to be subject in the event of— 
 (a) his discharge from hospital, or 
 (b) the grant of leave of absence from hospital to him. 
 (6) A condition is relevant for the purposes of subsection (5) if it appears to the Secretary of State that it might affect a victim of an offence in respect of which the determination was made. 
 (7) A scheme may require the Secretary of State to take all reasonable steps to ascertain whether a person who appears to him to be the victim of an offence in respect of which a relevant determination has been made wishes to make representations about the matters specified in subsection (8). 
 (8) The matters are— 
 (a) whether the person in respect of whom the determination has been made should be subject to any conditions in the event of his discharge from hospital or the grant of leave of absence from hospital to him; 
 (b) if so, what conditions. 
 (9) A scheme that includes provision such as is mentioned in subsection (7) must specify how the representations are to be made. 
 (10) A scheme may require other information in relation to the discharge of, or the grant of leave of absence to, persons in respect of whom relevant determinations are made to be made available under the scheme. 
 (11) The other information may include, in cases of a description specified by the scheme or in which the Secretary of State considers it appropriate, the date on which it is anticipated that a person in respect of whom a relevant determination has been made will be discharged or granted leave of absence from hospital. 
 (12) Subsections (5) to (8) of section 68 apply in relation to a scheme made under this section as they apply in relation to a scheme made under that section. 
 (13) A scheme may make different provision in relation to different descriptions of persons in respect of whom a relevant determination is made. 
 69B Views on leave of absence 
 (1) If a person who is the victim of an offence in respect of which a relevant determination has been made makes to the Secretary of State representations falling within subsection (2) the Secretary of State has the obligations specified in subsection (3). 
 (2) Representations fall within this subsection if they are to the effect that the grant of leave of absence to the person in respect of whom the determination has been made would threaten the safety, or otherwise adversely affect the well-being, of— 
 (a) the actual victim of the offence in respect of which the determination was made, or 
 (b) a person who is regarded for the purposes of a scheme under section 69A as a victim of that offence by virtue of section 68(5) (as applied by section 69A(12)). 
 (3) The Secretary of State must— 
 (a) have regard to the representations in deciding whether he should give his consent to leave of absence being granted, and 
 (b) inform the victim of any such decision. 
 (4) Section 69A(3) (relevant determination) applies for the purposes of this section.''. 
 (3) In section 70 (supplementary), after subsection (3) insert— 
 ''(4) In sections 68 and 69 references to a person serving a sentence of imprisonment in Northern Ireland include a person detained in hospital pursuant to a transfer direction and a restriction direction. 
 (5) In subsection (4) and section 69A(3)— 
 ''restriction direction'' has the meaning given in Article 55(2) of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986; 
 ''transfer direction'' has the meaning given in Article 53(2) of that Order. 
 (6) In section 69A(3)— 
 ''hospital order'' has the meaning given in Article 44(1) of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986; 
 ''restriction order'' has the meaning given in Article 47(1) of that Order; 
 ''sentence of imprisonment'' has the meaning given in Article 53(5) of that Order. 
 (7) In sections 69A and 69B ''leave of absence'' means leave of absence under Article 15 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986.''.'.—[Paul Goggins.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 35 - Surcharge payable on conviction

'(1) In Chapter 1 of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c.44) (general provisions about sentencing), after section 161 insert— 
 ''Surcharges 
 161A Court's duty to order payment of surcharge 
 (1) A court when dealing with a person for one or more offences must also (subject to subsections (2) and (3)) order him to pay a surcharge. 
 (2) Subsection (1) does not apply in such cases as may be prescribed by an order made by the Secretary of State. 
 (3) Where a court dealing with an offender considers— 
 (a) that it would be appropriate to make a compensation order, but 
 (b) that he has insufficient means to pay both the surcharge and appropriate compensation, 
 the court must reduce the surcharge accordingly (if necessary to nil). 
 (4) For the purposes of this section a court does not ''deal with'' a person if it— 
 (a) discharges him absolutely, or 
 (b) makes an order under the Mental Health Act 1983 in respect of him. 
 161B Amount of surcharge 
 (1) The surcharge payable under section 161A is such amount as the Secretary of State may specify by order. 
 (2) An order under this section may provide for the amount to depend on— 
 (a) the offence or offences committed, 
 (b) how the offender is otherwise dealt with (including, where the offender is fined, the amount of the fine), 
 (c) the age of the offender. 
 This is not to be read as limiting section 330(3) (power to make different provision for different purposes etc).'' 
 (2) In section 164 of that Act (fixing of fines), after subsection (4) insert— 
 ''(4A) In applying subsection (3), a court must not reduce the amount of a fine on account of any surcharge it orders the offender to pay under section 161A, except to the extent that he has insufficient means to pay both.'' 
 (3) In Part 1 of Schedule 9 to the Administration of Justice Act 1970 (c.31) (cases where payment enforceable as on summary conviction), after paragraph 12 insert— 
 ''13 Where under section 161A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 a court orders the payment of a surcharge.'' 
 (4) In Schedule 5 to the Courts Act 2003 (c.39) (collection of fines), in paragraph 1(1) (application of Schedule), after ''a fine'' insert ''or a surcharge imposed under section 161A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003''. 
 (5) The Secretary of State may by order— 
 (a) make provision amending Schedule 5 (collection of fines) or Schedule 6 (discharge of fines by unpaid work) to the Courts Act 2003 in its application by virtue of subsection (3) or (4) to surcharges; 
 (b) make provision for any part of Schedule 5, or the whole or any part of Schedule 6, not to apply to surcharges; 
 (c) make amendments to any enactment that are consequential on provision made under paragraph (a) or (b).'. 
 —[Paul Goggins.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 36 - Increase in maximum on-the-spot penalty for disorderly behaviour

'(1) In Chapter 1of Part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (c.16) (on-the-spot penalties for disorderly behaviour), section 3 is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (2) (maximum penalty that may be prescribed), at the end insert ''plus a half of the relevant surcharge''. 
 (3) After that subsection insert— 
 ''(2A) The ''relevant surcharge'', in relation to a person of a given age, is the amount payable by way of surcharge under section 161A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 by a person of that age who is fined the maximum amount for the offence.''.'.—[Paul Goggins.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 37 - Higher fixed penalty for repeated road traffic offences

'(1) The Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (c.53) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In section 53 (amount of fixed penalty), after subsection (2) insert— 
 ''(3) In particular, in relation to England and Wales an order made under subsection (1)(a) may prescribe a higher fixed penalty in a case where, in the period of three years ending with the date of the offence in question, the offender committed an offence for which— 
 (a) he was disqualified from driving, or 
 (b) penalty points were endorsed on the counterpart of any licence held by him.'' 
 (3) At the end of section 84 (regulations) (which becomes subsection (1)) insert— 
 ''(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide that where— 
 (a) a conditional offer has been issued under section 75 of this Act, 
 (b) the amount of the penalty stated in the offer is not the higher amount applicable by virtue of section 53(3) of this Act, and 
 (c) it subsequently appears that that higher amount is in fact applicable, 
 the fixed penalty clerk may issue a further notice (a ''surcharge notice'') requiring payment of the difference between the two amounts. 
 (3) Regulations under subsection (2) above may— 
 (a) provide for this Part of this Act to have effect, in cases to which the regulations apply, with such modifications as may be specified; 
 (b) make provision for the collection and enforcement of amounts due under surcharge notices.''.'.—[Paul Goggins.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 38 - Courts-martial etc

'Schedule (Unfitness to stand trial and insanity: courts-martial etc) (unfitness to stand trial and insanity: courts-martial etc) has effect.'.—[Paul Goggins.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 42 - Powers of authorised officers executing warrants

'(1) After section 125B of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (c.43) insert— 
 ''125BA Powers of persons authorised under section 125A or 125B 
 Schedule 4A to this Act, which confers powers on persons authorised under section 125A or 125B for the purpose of executing warrants for the enforcement of fines and other orders, shall have effect.'' 
 (2) After Schedule 4 to that Act insert the Schedule set out in Schedule (Powers of authorised officers executing warrants) to this Act.'.—[Mr. Leslie.]
 Brought up, and read the First time.

Christopher Leslie: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Government new clause 43—Disclosure orders for purpose of executing warrants. 
 Government new clause 44—Procedure on breach of community penalty etc. 
 Government new schedule 2—Powers of authorised officers executing warrants. 
 Government new schedule 3—Procedure on breach of community penalty etc. 
 Government amendments Nos. 125 and 126.

Christopher Leslie: I regret that it was not possible to table these amendments and new clauses earlier. In the event, we have had longer—about a week—to consider the details. The reason why they were delayed was that we saw an opportunity to make what I regard as vital changes to the law. As I explain the nature and contents of the amendments, I hope that it will become clear that they are an important addition to the arsenal available to the court to ensure that sentences for criminal offences are enforced correctly. That is their primary purpose. In ensuring the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, it is the Government's top priority to make greater use of fines and to enforce those fines once they are imposed.
 Significant progress is being made in improving the enforcement regimes, but some individuals clearly remain who will persistently try to evade the system and default a court sentence. We need to ensure that we are capable of effective enforcement at all times. I would like to emphasise that the amendments will not apply to bailiffs working for the civil court.

Lady Hermon: Will the Minister explain why the Irish Government are
 prepared to pay the fines of Irish nationals serving jail sentences in Columbia? Have the British Government made any approaches to the Irish Government in respect of the fines of Irish nationals who commit offences and do not pay their fines in this country?

Christopher Leslie: I do not have a ready answer for that question, not least because we are not talking about those jurisdictions now. Perhaps it will be useful if I speak to my colleagues in the Northern Ireland Office to see whether they have any thoughts or comments about that issue. We are talking today about the enforcement of criminal penalties imposed in courts in England and Wales, and it is important that we focus on that.
 New clause 42 would bring into effect the proposed new schedule 4A, which would give civilian enforcement officers and approved enforcement agencies the additional powers that they need to help to improve the enforcement of fines and community penalty breach warrants. New schedule 2 would provide the civilian enforcement officers and approved enforcement agencies, which are employed by magistrates courts, with several new powers to help them enforce fines and penalties. 
 First, the amendments give enforcement officers engaged by the magistrates courts the power to enter premises to execute a warrant of arrest, commitment, detention or distress where the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the offender who is a subject of warrant is present. Secondly, they give the persons engaged by the court the power to search offenders for dangerous articles such as hypodermic needles, knives and items that the offender may use to facilitate an escape from lawful custody. The provisions also give them the power to use reasonable force in exercising the other powers that are listed.

Lady Hermon: Will the Minister explain what training the new civilian enforcement officers will have on human rights obligations and PACE?

Christopher Leslie: I shall deal with some of those issues in a moment.
 In many cases, enforcement officers have been working with the police for some time to ensure that they have the opportunity to enforce warrants, but the police have been engaged in some of the more difficult operations. We want to ensure that our training arrangements for enforcement officers cover all the new powers that we make available to them. However, it is also important to recognise the professionalism that already exists in the enforcement profession and the fact that those staff are sometimes frustrated that they may be under threat, but are currently unable to adequately able to cope with the situation, because they have no powers of search. 
 There are currently no powers to enter premises to enforce warrants. One result is that is that only about 30 per cent. of distress warrants and 36 per cent. of community penalty breach warrants are executed successfully. The provisions will allow civilian enforcement officers and agencies to enforce warrants more effectively by allowing them to execute warrants against offenders who refuse to 
 open their doors when it is clear to the authorised officer that they are present. 
 Civilian enforcement officers frequently take offenders into custody and transport them to court, but they have no powers to search offenders for articles that may cause themselves or others harm, or that help them to escape from lawful custody, even if they believe that an offender has such items. Enforcement officers often find dangerous items discarded in their vehicles or hidden in places that could cause harm. I have spoken to enforcement officers who have found hypodermic needles hidden between car seats, yet they are using their vehicles regularly to take persons to and from court. That presents obvious health and safety concerns for those officers and other offenders who may use be using the same vehicles. 
 The powers will provide enforcement officers with much-needed health and safety protection in carrying out their duties. In parallel, it is important that we develop a training programme for staff and make sure that they are given sufficient guidance in respect of their employment arrangements. That is critical to the enforcement process and the use of these primary legislative powers. 
 The powers are necessary not only to minimise risk to the offender, but to ensure that fines can be enforced effectively. The legal advice that I have received is that the new powers are already available to police officers executing warrants of arrest and commitment under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The extension of the powers to civil enforcement officers and approved enforcement agencies will therefore not give rise to any questions of compatibility with the European convention on human rights.

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman is describing the measures as vital and urgent. If they are so vital and urgent, why were they not included in either the Courts Act 2003 or the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which we discussed only nine months ago and which covered this ground? How have circumstances changed since then to make the measures vital and urgent now, although they were not nine months ago?

Christopher Leslie: It may well have been that the measures were urgent nine months ago. I have had my current portfolio for about 12 months, and it became clear to me in the course of conversations with enforcement officers across the country that they would appreciate some clarity about their powers. They will appreciate the assurance that they have the scope to deal with circumstances such as the finding of dangerous articles on the person whom they are charged with arresting and taking into custody. I recommend to any hon. Member that they speak to their magistrates court committee and see at first hand the job that enforcement officers have to do. It is a very difficult job that is sometimes undertaken in very difficult circumstances.
 I have been with officers on the doorstep and accompanied them in the course of their job, and I was astonished that they did not have some of these powers. I felt that it was important to make sure that 
 we introduced them into legislation at the next available opportunity, which was this Bill.

Lady Hermon: As civilian enforcement officers will have increased police powers, can the Minister say whether, if such an officer happens to get something wrong when detaining someone or entering a house, a complaint will lie against them and go to the Independent Police Complaints Commission?

Christopher Leslie: Clearly, the current complaints process involves the court itself. Magistrates courts have arrangements for complainants and those brought into custody so that they may hear complaints about the operation of enforcement officers. Such officers are responsible to the court, so complaints go to the courts. Perhaps it would be of interest to the hon. Lady and to other Committee members if I sent out details of the current complaints process for court enforcement staff. However, we do not propose to change the current arrangements.

Dominic Grieve: The Minister said that he does not intend to change the complaints procedure, but we are greatly widening the powers given to court enforcement officers. Is he satisfied that the current complaints procedure is adequate, given the sort of complaints that might be made in view of the extension of powers?

Christopher Leslie: I am satisfied that the arrangements are sufficient. Moreover, there are consequences for anyone straying beyond the powers permitted in legislation, even if they are working for a public authority. The normal process for redress through the courts is available to any individual who feels aggrieved in respect of such persons.

Dominic Grieve: The Minister might not be following my point. At the moment, the police have an extremely good complaints procedure: it is often informal and it brings to their attention areas where the exercise of their powers, even if legitimate, is causing irritation or annoyance or is reducing their standing in the eyes of the public. I am not aware of such a procedure for enforcement officers, yet, the Minister is creating a system—with which I do not necessarily disagree—in which precisely such irritation and annoyance are likely to arise as they do with the police and I am not satisfied that there is a complaints procedure that addresses that. The Minister might be able to reassure me—I do not know.

Christopher Leslie: I hope to be able to reassure the hon. Gentleman. True, there is not the same complaints process as for the police, but court enforcement officers deal with a different range of persons: those convicted of criminal offences. If such officers stray beyond their legal powers, the offender may have redress, depending on the nature of the extension of powers. That provision is sufficient. I do not have evidence of a problem and I do not anticipate a need for complicated or bureaucratic complaints arrangements in addition to the present adequate ones in order to cope with any scenarios that might arise.
 The time has come to shift the balance so that there are powers for enforcement officers, who are often frustrated in the course of their work because of the narrow scope of their legal powers. The proposed modest changes will not add unnecessarily to complaints from offenders.

Dominic Grieve: To take one example, one of the powers that we are creating—I am not saying that it is a bad power—will enable the enforcement officer to enter the house of a wholly innocent third party in the belief that the person whom he wishes to apprehend is there. That is akin to a police power but is exercised for the specific purpose of fine enforcement, and that could give rise to problems. I am not satisfied that there is an informal complaints procedure, let alone a formal one, for court enforcement officers as there is for the police. If they are to be given the same powers, there ought to be a similar complaints procedure to that for the police.

Christopher Leslie: I do not believe that such a complaints procedure is necessary. For example, if a civilian enforcement officer broke down a door when it was not necessary to do so and went beyond the reasonable procedure in the new schedules and new clauses, he would be committing an offence of criminal damage and could be sued by the householder for trespass to goods. Moreover, if an officer used more force than was reasonably necessary while carrying out a search of an offender, he might be guilty of an offence of common assault. Such provisions are sufficient to deter enforcement officers from straying beyond their powers. Given that we do not envisage those situations arising, it is not necessary to have a complicated, convoluted complaints process. However, it is important that enforcement officers have reasonable powers to do their job effectively and enforce the will of the court. After all, we are talking about people who have been found guilty of criminal offences and against whom a sentence has been imposed but not complied with, perhaps because of default, which might be wilful. It is important that we extend the powers.

Vera Baird: My intervention is less about the complaints process than about getting clear in my mind the scale of the powers involved. As I understand the example given by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, we will be giving power to an enforcement officer to break down the door of a third party who has nothing to do with the case in order to serve a warrant on someone for a £40 fine.

Christopher Leslie: The crux of the matter lies in the phrasing used in the new clause and new schedule: the power must be exercised in a reasonable manner. I emphasise that we would give enforcement officers extra flexibility to enforce criminal penalties, not civil penalties such as non-payment of bills and so forth. In such circumstances, it is necessary for the will of the court to be upheld by enforcement officers. Frequently—in 6 to 7 per cent. of enforcement attempts—officers go to a house, see an individual through the net curtains and are frustrated and unable to enforce the court order. In such circumstances, it is necessary that they have the scope to act.
 Enforcement officers are professionals and they would use the powers reasonably. Under the Bill, they would only be sanctioned to use the powers reasonably—that is the safeguard that we want to put into the Bill. The time has come to make sure that when a court imposes a penalty, it is capable of being enforced.

David Heath: I was just considering the person who is so frustrated at waiting outside a window and not being able to do anything about it. Why on earth would he not fetch a constable in the traditional way? As I understand it, there is no rank structure among civilian enforcement officers. When we give powers to police officers, we often require an officer of a particular rank to authorise an action. Under the powers being discussed, there is no question of involving a senior authorised officer of any kind. Someone who had just been employed by one of the agencies offering such services could take the decision on what constituted reasonable grounds for breaking down the door of the third party to gain entry to premises where he supposed somebody else might be.

Christopher Leslie: I do not believe that the circumstances set out in the Bill would allow for unreasonable activities. There are those safeguards; if the officers are unreasonable, they will be committing an offence. Also, it is important to recognise that it is the job of the police to catch those whom they suspect are engaged in criminal activity; the police are not wholly involved in the enforcement of court sentences. If the police were consistently diverted to enforcement activities in a way that detracted from their primary activity, that could well be to the detriment of the wider community. I do not want to see police officers spending excessive time at the enforcement end of the system.
 The courts and the enforcement officers should enforce the penalties for which they are responsible. Those whom we charge with the enforcement of penalties, who do a difficult job at present—arresting, detaining and transporting offenders to court—already have the scope to cope with threats to their safety and with searching individuals. It is necessary to put beyond doubt the debate about whether such officers have the powers for search and entry in common law. We want to put that matter beyond doubt, to make the power statutory and to include it in the Bill.

Cheryl Gillan: May I give the Minister an example of another set of circumstances, which I witnessed recently in my apartment block? Two extremely large men, who turned out to be bailiffs, were standing over a small woman neighbour of mine, ostensibly to recover moneys in connection with an unpaid congestion charge. When I went outside the block, there was yet another man in a black leather jacket, looking extremely threatening and a bit like a member of the Stasi. I challenged him twice, because he had no right to be there, but he continued to wander around a locked area of my apartment block. If, as the hon. and learned Member for Redcar says, we give bailiffs the right to enter premises to collect £40, what security checks will there be on such people? They would have
 an unwarranted measure of power, and I have seen them being threatening, even at this stage.

Christopher Leslie: We do not envisage bailiffs using the powers in civil enforcement activities, such as collecting congestion charges and parking fines. The powers are to be used to deal with persons convicted of criminal offences who have not complied with the lengthy process of the courts enforcing the fines. That does not mean that the individual will have been asked to pay only at court upon conviction. They will have gone through a period in which a warrant was issued to them—it might have been posted to them or served on them in person at their door—and the enforcement officer might find months or even years later that there has been a constant snubbing of the court's authority.
 We need to ensure that no matter what the conviction, the court can use the authority of the enforcement officers to ensure that justice is done, even in relation to offences that the hon. Lady might regard as minor criminal offences. Although we do not envisage that the powers will be used frequently because the circumstances in which they will be used will not be the norm in the enforcement process, it is important that enforcement officers can make it clear to offenders that they have the power to recover the fine and detain them, should they exercise the powers that we are proposing.

Lady Hermon: Will the Minister quantify the problem that we are facing by giving the Committee an estimate of the amount of outstanding fines? That would be helpful.

Christopher Leslie: I am afraid that over the years a significant backlog of outstanding fines of something in the order of a couple of hundred million pounds has been accrued in England and Wales. Traditionally, only about half the fines imposed have been collected, although this year we improved that and in the outturn for the last quarter of the last financial year we managed to recover about 76 per cent. of the fines imposed. However, that means that 24 per cent. of fines have not been recovered, which is unacceptable. It is important that courts have the powers to take that extra step to enforce the decisions that they have made if necessary.
 If we are to improve public confidence in the criminal justice system, the public needs to see that persons are arrested if they are suspected of committing a crime, and are taken through the courts and fined or sentenced appropriately if they are found guilty. Given that offenders sometimes manage to evade their sentence, perhaps because of legal loopholes, is it any wonder that the public have little confidence in the criminal justice system? The steps that we are proposing are necessary to improve public confidence and make it clear that people cannot avoid paying their dues if they are fined for committing a criminal offence. 
 The hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham asked about security checks. We already have security checks for fine enforcement officers, but in April 2005, under the unified administration process, we will be rolling out the new post of fine enforcement officer, which was provided for in the Courts Act 2003. There 
 will be further improvements for those fine enforcement officers who will have new powers under the Act, and extra security provisions will be associated with them.

Lady Hermon: I am concerned that we are increasing powers to civilian enforcement officers without a full explanation being given to the Committee. Could the Minister reflect on the fact, which he has indicated to the Committee, that recent figures show a significant improvement in the recovery of fines from offenders. That happened before any extension of powers to civilian enforcement officers. Could the Minister enlighten us as to how that improvement was achieved without the extension of these powers?

Christopher Leslie: I certainly could, because I feel as though I have been living and breathing the court enforcement process for the past 12 months. That is a major achievement, and I am glad that the hon. Lady recognises it. The figure has increased to 76 per cent. in the last quarter, but that is due to squeezing every last available opportunity through the existing legal powers and managing the system as rigorously as we can within the legislative framework. That is not to say that we cannot make further improvements. However, today, we are talking not just about the sentences of the court, but about compensation for the victims of crime that frequently is not paid by the offender.
 I am sure that we all know individuals—many of them constituents—who have complained that despite an offender being found guilty and sentenced, they evade the system and never pay the compensation due to the victim. It is important that we give the extra powers to enforcement officers so that they can ensure that the compensation goes to the victim. That is why it is important to take steps in the Bill to cover victims' provisions, among other things. We can make further improvements beyond the 76 per cent. that we already have achieved, because a significant number of offenders still evade the system. 
 New clause 43 gives magistrates courts the power to access information held by organisations in the public and private sectors, such as financial institutions and local authorities, which might be of assistance in tracing offenders whose whereabouts are unknown. Currently, despite the courts' best efforts, they have few ways of keeping track of offenders' details if the offender chooses not to inform them of any changes to those details. This power will be used where there is an outstanding fine or community penalty breach warrant against an offender, and all other routes whereby they might have been traced have been exhausted. 
 Civilian enforcement officers and approved agencies can regularly be impeded in executing warrants due an offender's details not being correct. That can happen for a number of reasons: the offender may have given false information or multiple addresses, or he may have moved from the address that was initially given. That contributes to many unsuccessfully executed warrants each year. In such circumstances, it is 
 possible that both public and private organisations may hold more up-to-date information on offenders than the court. However, the inability of the court to access such data is a substantial barrier to an effective enforcement regime. The information that is required under this measure—name, address, date of birth and national insurance number where available—should be available to the courts to enforce sentences more effectively. 
 Although the Department for Constitutional Affairs is seeking other methods to improve the provision of data to courts, such as sharing data voluntarily between Departments, this power will help to maximise the courts' data-sharing potential. I should like to make it clear that the power is fully compliant with all current data protection legislation. Schedule 1 to the Data Protection Act 1998 sets out the principles that must be adhered to: ''processing'' includes the disclosure of data to another party, and ''personal data'' include the type of information that would be obtained under the data disclosure order. 
 Under the first data protection principle, 
''Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, shall not be processed unless . . . at least one of the''
 range of 
''conditions in Schedule 2 is''
 satisfied. One condition is that 
''processing is necessary . . . for the administration of justice''.
 That encompasses our proposals. Under the second principle, 
''Personal data must be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with . . . those purposes.''
 However, there are relevant exemptions in section 35 of the 1998 Act. Disclosure of personal data is permitted where it is required by the order of a court or is necessary 
''for the purpose of, or in connection with, any legal proceedings (including prospective legal proceedings)''.
 Either of those exemptions would encompass our proposal. My Department's legal group assures me that those powers are also compliant with the European convention on human rights. 
 New clause 44 is necessary to bring into effect the schedule containing the powers to allow the proceedings on a breach of a community penalty to be commenced and heard by a court other than the one responsible for overseeing the community penalty in the first place. I had meetings with several justices' chief executives. Mr. Alan Eccles, the justices' chief executive for the west midlands, expressed very clearly his frustration that he did not have sufficient powers to allow proceedings to breach and a community penalty to be commenced and heard by a magistrates court other than the court responsible for overseeing that initial community penalty. 
 New schedule 3 gives the courts those powers. That will enable warrants to be enforced more effectively. That is an example of responding to grassroots concerns about the powers being inadequate. At present, there are restrictions on which courts can enforce a community penalty. The precise form of the 
 restrictions vary according to the type of sentence, but in practice they tend to mean that only the court that passed the sentence can issue a warrant or summons to secure the attendance of an offender who is in breach, and a warrant or summons must specify that the defendant appears before that court. 
 The new powers are necessary to improve performance, particularly in respect of breached warrants. The current situation creates difficulties where the offender moves away from the area of the court and fails to contact the probation service. It is essential that any magistrates court is allowed to execute a warrant or summons to secure the attendance of an offender. The powers will bring efficiency gains for the courts by more effective and efficient deployment of enforcement officers. 
 Government amendments Nos. 126 and 127 simply amend the long title of the Bill to include the subject matter of the other new clauses and new schedules. Those changes are necessary. I believe that enforcement officers will welcome them, and I hope that they will raise public confidence in the ability of the courts to enforce their decisions.

Dominic Grieve: At a late stage, the Government have given us a massive area to consider. The Minister has properly split it into three areas. First, I shall concentrate on the powers of the authorised officers. I am broadly satisfied with his explanations on the other two matters that he raised, although I may return to one or two points of detail.
 We need to go back to some basic principles, and I make no apology for doing so. Policing in the United Kingdom—and certainly in England and Wales—is, to use the right expression, carried out by consent. That means that it requires the consent of the people who are being policed and that it is an absolute and central principle that a great deal of time and effort should be expended on trying to secure consent. 
 The fact that there is a theoretical justification for an action does not necessarily secure consent in the real world. I spent some of my political career cutting my teeth in parts of south London and standing as a candidate for an area that included Brixton in the mid-1980s, where it was obvious what happens when the limits of consent in communities are reached in relation to policing. Successive Governments have taken those facts on board by going to considerable lengths to ensure the monitoring of the performance of the police, oversight of the manner in which they carry out their work, and—sometimes this is contrary to the wishes of other people in this country—the making of concessions with regard to what they can or cannot do in order to maintain consent. 
 Only last weekend, a Minister of State at the Home Office expressed concern that, although there was no suggestion that the police were doing their job improperly, the manner in which the power given to them under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 in respect of stopping and searching at random was being carried out might lead to a progressive withdrawal of consent in certain sections of society because they feel that the actions are oppressive or onerous even though Parliament has 
 decreed that they are appropriate in view of the threat that we are facing. I make those preliminary remarks because we must bear such facts in mind when considering the powers that we are giving authorised officers in executing warrants. 
 Authorised officers are bailiffs, as has been said, although we are admittedly using different terminology and giving them a slightly different guise. On the whole, my experience with bailiffs, which comes from dealing with them in legislation and even professionally, is that many are of the utmost reputability and use considerable sensitivity in carrying out their work. None the less, we are about to give considerable powers to non-uniformed individuals—namely authorised officers of the court. We are allowing them to enter private premises, which will not necessarily be the premises of the person whom they are seeking, to carry out searches. We are allowing them the most extensive powers for the perfectly laudable reason that the Minister has given: ensuring that fines are paid and that the 76 per cent. rate goes up to 80 per cent. or 90 per cent. 
 I do not disagree with that objective. However, Parliament has a long history of paying considerable attention to how powers are exercised, and as there could be serious consequences for the relationship between law enforcement agencies and the wider community, I am a little surprised that we are apparently introducing such potentially draconian legislation without paying real regard to the consequences on the ground on a day-to-day basis. 
 When we intervened on the Minister, I would have been greatly reassured if he had said that he recognised that point, but that the Government would set up a supervisory authority to ensure the collation of statistics and the circulation of best practice, and to provide a regulatory mechanism for the informal resolution of complaints. However, we are giving powers to groups and individuals who—I do not mean this too pejoratively—carry out their operations as lone rangers. There is no central co-ordination, and I do not believe that there will be, although some professional bodies cover the organisations involved. I am anxious that we are creating the potential for the build-up of resentments that may ultimately manifest themselves in public order problems. 
 If the Minister is right in his intention and aim, it must follow that the powers described in the new clause will frequently be invoked, because that will be necessary if we are to raise the 76 per cent. level and meet the target. I dare say that bailiffs and enforcement officers will sometimes visit millionaires' properties, but the nature of things suggests that it will be in deprived areas that people accumulate unpaid fines, because that is the way that the world is. That means that it will mainly be in areas of deprivation that enforcement officers will carry out their perfectly commendable duties. In the process, they will be going into people's houses, knocking down their doors and doing all the other activities that the police have to do, but there will be no point of reference or contact such as the local police station or a local beat officer who can help resolve underlying tensions and disputes. 
 We need those mechanisms, which we have tried to introduce over a 25-year period, at a time when the country is very diverse. There are all sorts of new people in the country with new cultural norms, and those norms include views on the privacy of the home and the sanctity of the family unit. Those things have to be resolved so as to allow the smooth running of society. I have to say that I do not see any sign whatever in the legislation that those factors have been taken into account. If the legislation starts to go wrong, the first consequence will be that we will have to revisit the issues at a parliamentary level. We will have to create the necessary structures. I am a Conservative; I dislike spending money unnecessarily, and I do not particularly want further bureaucratic supervisory structures. However, for once I am not sure that there is not a necessity for one. 
 I want to make sure that the system works, and I am not at all convinced that the proposed structures will work. The enforcement officers will be very active in some parts of our metropolitan centres; they will be out of uniform, they will go around trying to enforce the court orders and making inquiries and they will inevitably be intrusive into property. They will be visible and may cause resentment. None of that means that we should not go ahead with this project, but we should be very careful about what we are doing. 
 In response to my interventions, the Minister placed great emphasis on the fact that there would be formal methods of redress. I am not interested in formal methods of redress, but in the informal methods of redress that my experience as a politician suggests are far more effective and less costly in resolving the sorts of disputes that arise even in my own constituency involving people who feel that they have been improperly stopped by the police. As I always say to my police officers, ''Forget about the formal complaints system; send somebody round to have a chat with him.'' Where would that happen in this context? 
 I am not against the proposals, but I do not think that the consequences of the new powers have been fully or properly thought through. If they had been, the Minister would have been able to tell us more. May I urge him to do a bit of thinking and consultation between now and Report? 
 I do not mean this unkindly to the Minister, who is sitting next to the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale, East (Paul Goggins), but I hope that there is enough joined-up government on this matter. This issue falls very much within the Home Office remit on community relations. I want to hear that there has been adequate Home Office input and link-up in establishing that what is proposed will work smoothly and properly, and that the glitches that I fear will be inevitable will be capable of resolution. Those are my concerns about the powers being given to authorised officers. 
 On the whole, we have had a very good set of rules in this country that tries, as far as is possible and compatible with proper law enforcement, to minimise the rights of the state against the individual. I accept that they have to be adjusted from time to time, and this may be the time to adjust them on enforcement. If we are to adjust them, however, we should be jolly careful that we understand the consequences and that we take steps to minimise the problems that could arise. Those are my comments on new schedule 2. 
 I am much more sympathetic towards the other proposals. It seems to me that the Minister has put in adequate safeguards, particularly in relation to data sharing, that reduce what is sought to a minimum, and that that is compatible with his objectives. 
 I wish to raise a question about the community penalties. If breaches of community penalties are not to be dealt with by the court that carried out the original sentencing, how will we ensure that the courts are seized sufficiently of the full facts that would enable them to deal with such matters properly? I accept that, even now, a person does not necessarily go back to the same court or tribunal that originally sentenced them, but I am concerned that the information should be able to pass adequately from one court to another. I am afraid that my experience as a lawyer is that information very often does not pass from one court to another, which can lead to potential injustice. With that reservation, I understand what the Minister seeks to do.

David Heath: I share the hon. Gentleman's broad analysis. I do not have a great problem with the latter amendments, but I have very serious issues to raise about new clause 42 and new schedule 2 that go much wider than my initial and perhaps inevitable comment. After spending hour after hour, week after week and month after month discussing two major measures—the Courts Act 2003 and the Criminal Justice Act 2003—I do not understand why these provisions were not introduced in that legislation, unless it was because Ministers felt that they could not pass such contentious legislation at that time. Perhaps they felt that the softer option was to introduce it now.
 No one would argue against the need for the better enforcement of fines and court sentencing. No one wants to see anyone get away with cocking a snook at the courts and not paying their due. However, that must tempered against the limits in law in this country that allow some of our citizens to do things to other citizens. We do not normally allow people to arrest other citizens, forcibly to enter their homes, cause distress by taking their property or search them. For clear reasons, however, there are certain categories of people to whom we do give that power, and they are generally people about whom we use the term ''office of constable''. I still feel that the office of constable is important. I know that the Government do not give a toss about it, but although they do not care how far they blur the edges, many people in this country, including the police themselves, feel that an important distinction must be made between those to whom we provide extensive powers and those to whom we do not. 
 I am worried that we are extending powers to somebody called an authorised officer. That person might work directly for the court or for a company that will presumably have been contracted on the basis of having offered the lowest tender for the provision of services to a court for executing warrants. The Government are proposing that those individuals or companies, which will not have a training requirement, a reporting system or a complaints system in the same way that the police do, should be allowed on the basis of an outstanding warrant to seek forcibly to enter premises, search the person whom they find there and arrest that person and take them away. Those are serious points. 
 If a police officer were to exercise his powers inappropriately, everybody would know what to do about it. They could go to the senior officer—the superintendent or chief superintendent—of the basic command unit in the area. If they failed to get satisfaction, they could go to the chief constable, and the case might be investigated by the chief or deputy chief constable. If they were not satisfied with that, they could invoke the internal complaints procedure or the external complaints procedure through the Independent Police Complaints Commission. 
 However, I bet that not a single Committee member would know what to do if the individual involved were an employee of Group 4 or whoever has the contract to provide services to a local court. I bet that they would not know what to do if their door were knocked down and they were searched in the belief that they had something that was adverse to the execution of the warrant or if they were arrested on that basis. 
 The sole safeguard is that the officer can exercise his power only to the extent that it is reasonably required for the purpose. However, it would be easy to argue that exercising the power was reasonably required to effect a warrant, although that may have been wrong, and that the officer had reasonable grounds for believing that the person involved was on the premises. That judgment could be left to the discretion of the newest employee of the company, which is at arm's length from the court that issued the warrant. 
 It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
 Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.